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Financial innovation consists of doing more (trading) with less (collateral). A key innova-
tion, present in all modern economies, is the use of fiat money—a kind of virtual collateral whose 
value derives only from the force of law and custom. Conventional wisdom says that fiat money 
can enhance liquidity through “credit policy”—the directed relaxation of collateral constraints 
through a central bank’s lending operations, and through “monetary policy”—the beneficial ma-
nipulation of economic aggregates through variation of the money stock.
2 
Fiat money, and its implications for policy, are usually seen as the twentieth-century devel-
opments. This paper analyzes an earlier and less well known experiment with fiat money, under-
taken by the Bank of Amsterdam (Amsterdamsche Wisselbank, henceforth AWB or simply 
“bank”). The Amsterdam experience with fiat money is noteworthy for its originality, its promi-
nence in European financial history, and its compatibility with price stability over a long period 
(roughly a century: 1680 through 1780). The AWB opened in 1609 as a municipal exchange 
bank, an institution for facilitating settlement that was common in Early Modern Europe. Our 
focus is on the period around 1683 when the bank limited its depositors’ ability to withdraw 
coin, and so effectively became a fiat money provider. The fiat money regime remained in place 
until the bank’s collapse in 1795.
3 
The AWB’s transition from exchange bank to fiat bank has been described by economic 
historians (e.g., Mees 1838, van Dillen 1934, Neal 2000, Gillard 2004, van Nieuwkerk 2009), but 
these contributions do not fully explain the motivation for the transition. If fiat money did indeed 
lower and smooth the costs of collateral in Amsterdam markets, how were these changes mani-
                                                 
2 In its pure form credit policy does not change the stock of money; see e.g., King and Goodfriend (1988). 
3 The bank was not fully dissolved until 1819.  
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fested and who benefited? To lapse into modern terminology, how did an early central bank alter 
its monetary and credit policies after limiting the right of withdrawal?  
To shed some light, we examine historical data on the AWB. Using ledgers available from 
the Amsterdam Municipal Archives, we have compiled partial balance sheets, at a daily fre-
quency, for the AWB from 1666 through 1702, a period centered on the fiat money transition. 
When combined with information from other sources, these data present a revealing picture of 
the bank’s activities. 
First, the data clearly show that the fiat money regime facilitated the AWB’s lending to a 
preferred customer, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Ostindische Compagnie or 
VOC, a government-sponsored enterprise employing approximately 50,000 people during our 
period of interest). The bank lent to the Company both before and after 1683; but afterward this 
lending becomes more seasonal and regular in nature. Seasonality means that this lending often 
does not show up in the annual AWB balance sheets assembled by van Dillen (1925) nor in the 
annual balance sheets of the VOC assembled by de Korte (1984). Lending was cheaper and less 
risky for the AWB after 1683 because liquid claims on the bank were limited and chances of a 
run were ameliorated. Lending activities were extensive but, over the period considered, never 
exposed the bank to substantial credit risk. We find that the 1683 changes also freed the City of 
Amsterdam to frequently take the bank’s retained earnings from this profitable activity. 
Secondly, our analysis indicates that both before and after 1683, the AWB regularly en-
gaged in open market operations. Again, however, the character of this intervention evolves un-
der the fiat regime, as the bank more often chose to “drain funds” by selling off its metal stock. 
Indirect evidence suggests that an objective of these operations was to smooth short-term fluc-
tuations in the stock of base money.  
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To summarize, the data we analyze show that by the time of 1683 transition, the AWB 
managers had ample experience with both lending and open market operations. The move to fiat 
money simply allowed for more vigorous pursuit of these same activities. The markets seem to 
have applauded the change: following the 1683 reorganization, there was widespread agreement 
that trading had been enhanced by this new, if puzzling, kind of money. Writing in 1767, James 
Denham-Steuart offered the following explanation: 
The bank of Amsterdam pays none in either gold or silver coin, or bullion; conse-
quently it cannot be said, that the florin banco [bank money] is attached to the met-
als. What is it then which determines its value? I answer, That which it can bring; 
and what it can bring when turned into gold or silver, shows the proportion of the 
metals to every other commodity whatsoever at that time: such and such only is the 
nature of an invariable scale.
4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the historical stage for the 1683 
policy change. Section 3 describes and presents the data. Section 4 offers some interpretations of 
the data. Section 5 discusses related literature, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Historical prologue 
For Amsterdam, the original purpose of its exchange bank was to protect commercial credi-
tors from the unreliable commodity money in general circulation. Modest debasement and resul-
tant inflation was ubiquitous in the Early Modern Netherlands, so the AWB was to be an island 
of debt settlement backed by high-quality coins (Quinn and Roberds 2009b). To support settle-
ment, the bank needed to attract metal deposits, get debtors to internally transfer payments to 
creditors, and deliver out metal of an assured quality. The Dutch chose to follow the model of 
Venice’s Banco di Rialto and make the AWB an exchange bank that provided only payment and 
                                                 
4 (Steuart 1805, 75-76). For another favorable review of the Dutch monetary system see Adam Smith, Wealth of 
Nations, Book IV, Chapter 3.  
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settlement services (Dehing and ‘t Hart 1997, 45-6).
5 With no lending, the bank was to cover 
operating expenses with fees. 
Asymmetric rules promoted metal inflows and debt settlement but discouraged metal out-
flows. On the accommodating side, the AWB had no fees on deposits or internal transfers.
6 Also, 
one could present the AWB with precious metal in any form. If a coin had a price assigned by 
statute, then the bank honored that price. Metal in other forms was valued by precious metal con-
tent. And once created, a balance could settle a debt through transfer to the creditor’s account. 
Creditors gained finality and a trusted general collateral claim. Similar to modern large-value 
payment systems (e.g., Fedwire), the AWB created finality through gross settlement, meaning 
that the bank payments could credibly be viewed as final because the bank avoided extending 
credit and never (explicitly) adopted netting of payments.
7  
Withdrawals, in contrast, were costly. The bank was obliged to supply high-quality Dutch 
coins at official prices, but the bank was allowed to charge a withdrawal fee of up to 2 percent 
for silver coins and 2.5 percent for gold coins, though under normal conditions, fees averaged 1.5 
percent or less (Van Dillen 1964a, 348; see also Table 2 below). The fees compensated the bank 
for minting costs and helped cover operating expenses. Most important to our story, however, is 
that the fees discouraged withdrawals. Some uncertainty also existed, for the bank had discretion 
regarding which of those Dutch coins it offered at withdrawal. If a customer desired a different 
                                                 
5 Unlike later central banks, the AWB did not issue circulating banknotes. 
6 The bank was permitted to charge transfer fees but chose not to until 1683 (van Dillen 1934, 85).  
7 Some qualifications are necessary. The bank cleared payments once every day (Mees 1838, 124-5) so there was in 
principle scope for multilateral netting at a daily frequency, i.e., the practical seventeenth-century definition of “real-
time” gross settlement was probably once per day. Also, an examination of AWB account positions every half year 
indicates that despite rules to the contrary, some accounts were in an overdraft position during the summer months 
of peak market activity, particularly before the 1683 transition (Willemsen 2009).  
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coin, then the bank could charge an additional premium based on its role as a moneychanger. 
Moneychanger fees of some level were necessary to prevent coin-to-coin arbitrage.
8 
This paper focuses on the consequences of withdrawal structure, yet we stress that the ef-
fects of the early AWB’s high withdrawal fees varied by customer. Unlike a modern central 
bank, anyone could open an account, so customers ranged from foreign merchants to financial 
intermediaries. Among merchants who routinely operated within the bank’s internal payment 
system, fees were a negligible concern, for they did not expect to withdraw balances. Of far 
greater moment to them was that the city of Amsterdam required all large bills of exchange to be 
settled at the AWB. The requirement created demand for deposits, for bills of exchange were the 
primary means of commercial credit. The bank’s total balances reached 925,562 guilders after 
one year (van Dillen 1934, 117), and grew to 8.3 million guilders by 1683, approximately 5 per-
cent of the coin stock of the Dutch Republic (De Vries and van der Woude 1997, 90).
9  
In contrast, customers who did expect to withdraw specie learned to skip the primary ac-
count-to-coin process offered by the bank. One could avoid bank fees by paying for coins outside 
the bank with free transfer inside the bank. Fee avoidance also meant that potential deposit cus-
tomers did not bring metal to the bank. By 1650, the outside market in bank balances had deep-
ened as private bankers, called cashiers, emerged as dealers who specialized in holding AWB 
balances and various coins (Van Dillen 1964a, 366-7). 
The secondary market lived on margins within the bid-ask spread of the AWB’s primary 
coin-account facility, and the expected costs of the primary market were particularly high for 
short-term deposits. For example, someone who deposited metal and withdrew it one month later 
at a 1 percent fee had, in effect, borrowed funds at a simple annualized rate of 12 percent. The 
                                                 
8 Arbitrage is discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
9 The guilder, also known as the florin, was the unit of account in the Dutch Republic. At the time of the AWB’s 
founding, the guilder did not correspond to an actual coin in circulation.   
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AWB was thus an expensive place to “park” specie. Relative costs fell with time, and long-term 
participants in the Amsterdam payment system, like cashier-bankers, could recoup these “bor-
rowing” costs through their secondary market operations. As a result, the short-term metal mar-
ket stayed outside the bank, and little metal routinely flowed in or out of the bank. Instead, de-
posits waited for periods of cheap metal and withdrawals for expensive metal. 
2.1 Lending 
Lending was the first major deviation from the bank’s original plan. The bank soon began 
lending to the city, the province of Holland, the Republic, government sponsored entities like the 
VOC, and select individuals such as mint masters and officers of the Admiralty (Van Dillen 
1934, 94-100).
10 After a turbulent half century, however, the bank limited new lending to Am-
sterdam and the VOC. Table 1 gives the bank’s balance sheet at the end of January 1669. The 
bank’s metal-to-deposit ratio is 74 percent. While not a reckless position, the bank needed to be 
mindful of the threat of a run.  
Table 1.  Bank of Amsterdam Balance Sheet as of January 31, 1669 
(Millions of Bank Guilders) 
Assets Liabilities 
4.5  Metal  6.1  Deposits 
2.1  Loan to Amsterdam   
0.2  Loan to Holland   
1.1  Loan to VOC  1.8  Capital 
  
7.9 Total  7.9 Total 
Source: Amsterdam Municipal Archives, 5077-1314. 
                                                 
10 The bank’s lending activities were widely rumored, but the bank did not publicly acknowledge these until much 
later. See, e.g., Steuart (1805, 403).   
8 
 
Indeed, the French invasion of the Dutch Republic triggered a run in June 1672, during 
which (our calculations find) the bank lost 34 percent of its balances in two weeks.
11 Both the 
Province of Holland and the VOC suspended debt payments,
 12 but the bank successfully passed 
this test, partly because withdrawal fees had kept the large yet volatile short-term specie flows 
out of the bank. The absence of “hot money” directly reduced the scale of the run and spared the 
bank the adverse signals produced by the sudden flight of short-term capital. 
Evidence also suggests that the bank adjusted fees to affect withdrawal rates, for the bank 
raised fees in 1672 and kept them high for years afterward. Average fees can be estimated from 
the ratio of the bank’s non-interest revenues as a percentage of total withdrawals from 1666 to 
1681; these ratios are reported in Table 2. The calculation is possible because the bank reported 
its revenue for these years.
13 From total revenue, we subtract interest from loans to get a numera-
tor that is an imperfect proxy for fee revenue because we do not know the extent of non-
withdrawal revenue from sources like overdraft fees, bullion trading, etc., so we cannot explain 
what loss adjustment created an outlier like the 1676 observation. The denominator we have con-
structed from the AWB’s ledgers, and we are missing complete withdrawal information for three 
of the years. Peering through noise and missing years, fees rose in 1671 as war fears and with-
drawals mounted, fees jumped in 1672 with the panic, and fees remained high until at least 1675. 
                                                 
11 On June 14, 1672, the AWB’s total balances were 7.6 million guilders. Balances had fallen to 5.0 million by June 
30 with a metal stock at an estimated 4.5 million. 
12 For sovereign debt, see Gelderblom and Jonker (2010). For the VOC, see de Korte (1984, 66). 
13 After 1683, the AWB reported only profit: revenue less expenses.  
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Table 2. AWB Non-Interest Revenues as a Percent of Withdrawals 
1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 
0.76% 0.79% 0.84% 0.93% 0.78% 1.24% 2.19%  NA 
        
1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 
1.61%  1.53%  0.13% NA 1.00% NA 1.00%  1.78% 
Source: See Appendix A. 
2.2  The Bank Guilder 
The other major deviation from the bank’s original scheme requires some background, for 
it defies conventional expectations, then and now (Quinn and Roberds 2009a). In 1638, the 
Dutch Republic raised the official price of a coin called the patagon, a coin minted in the 
neighboring Spanish Netherlands. The invading patagon intentionally contained 4 percent less 
silver than the domestic rijksdaalder issued by the AWB. The new price put the bank in an un-
sustainable position, for the 1638 rule said that the bank had to accept patagons at 2.5 guilders 
each, but the old rules made the bank to offer out rijksdaalders at the same price. After a period 
of arbitrage losses, the bank switched to giving out patagons at withdrawal — a 4 percent “hair-
cut” for depositors. To then make depositors whole in terms of silver, but still avoid rekindling 
arbitrage, the AWB decided in 1645 to reduce the price of patagons at the bank by 4 percent, 
from 2.5 to 2.4 guilders each. So, in the end, a customer received 4 percent more coins per guil-
der, but each coin held 4 percent less silver. 
This ad hoc solution had the unintended effect of creating a separate unit of account for 
bank funds, the bank guilder, distinct from the current (non-bank) guilder (Quinn and Roberds 




14 In turn, a secondary market developed between the two units of account. Figure 1 offers 
before and after schematics. Before 1638, each type of coin had a direct secondary market rela-
tionship with the bank that swapped media of exchange: coins for accounts. After 1645, the sec-
ondary market focused on exchanging units of account: bank guilders for current guilders. A 
separate price then traded current guilder accounts at cashier-bankers into coins. 
Figure 1. Secondary Market Structure 
 
The exchange market between bank guilders and current guilders deepened to become the 
principal measure of the value of the bank guilder. The exchange rate was called the agio, and 
the market measured the agio as the premium commanded by bank guilders. If the agio was 3 
percent, then 100 bank guilders bought 103 current guilders. To the extent that the metal content 
of current money changed only slowly after 1659, the agio can be thought of as a price of bank 
money in terms of a reference collateral good, i.e. silver. Because of the relatively high with-
drawal fees, however, the primary market remained little used. 
                                                 
14 When the Dutch Republic replaced the patagon with domestic coins in its 1659 minting ordinance, the state re-
tained the dual price structure and assigned two silver coins, the dukaat and the rijder, a distinct bank guilder value, 
current guilder value, and implicit exchange rate. See Table 5. 
Bank  
Guilder 
Coin  Account 












2.3 The 1683 restructuring 
The changes of the 1680s—the focus of this paper—hinge around the AWB introducing a 
new primary withdrawal structure that greatly reduced the asymmetry between deposits and 
withdrawals.
15 In 1683, the bank started to give customers a receipt for the specific coins they 
deposited.
16 At withdrawal, the receipt obliged the AWB to return the same coins at the deposit 
price. Also, the receipt’s redemption fee was only ½ percent for gold and ¼ percent for silver. 
Customers found the receipt’s specific claim and low fee far more attractive than the traditional 
general claim at a high fee. Customers rushed to use the new facility. 
The bank also made receipts negotiable, and resale mattered because the pre-existing stock 
bank guilders did not get receipts, so about 8 million bank guilders had only the right to expen-
sive traditional withdrawal.
17 For new deposits, the 1683 reform unbundled the traditional de-
posit contract (in which a depositor receives a transferable claim on the bank, plus an option to 
withdraw) into two separate contracts: the bank guilder account and the receipt. The receipt’s 
option to withdraw metal lasted six months, but one could renew a receipt for another six months 
by paying the withdrawal fee. Receipts were especially popular with foreign merchants as a low-
cost way of temporarily parking precious metals in Amsterdam, to take advantage of profitable 
trading opportunities if these presented themselves. Coin could be withdrawn later as necessary, 
at low cost. 
Customers learned to trade for the new withdrawal claim instead of exercise the old claim 
attached to the account, so demand for traditional withdrawal withered. This circumstance al-
                                                 
15 The new structure had been suggested by an Amsterdam businessman, Johannes Phoonsen, in a 1676 essay (van 
Dillen 1921). At this time the bank also began charging both sides of all transfers 0.00025 percent payable at the end 
of the fiscal year (van Dillen 1934, 85).  
16 The receipt allowed its holder to claim the coin anytime within a six-month period, i.e., the receipt resembled an 
American call option on a specific type of coin, or put option on bank funds. 
17 Legally, new deposits became repurchase agreements between the depositor and AWB (van Dillen 1964b, 395).  
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lowed the AWB to quietly limit the right to traditional withdrawal sometime in the 1680s.
18 This 
is when the bank guilder transformed into quasi-fiat money in that one had a right to withdraw 
metal only if one had a receipt. The stock of bank guilders split into commodity-backed receipts 
and what Mees (1838) terms an “irredeemable coin of account”—fiat money. 
Amsterdam’s acquiescence to fiat money seems to follow from customers no longer ex-
pecting to use traditional withdrawal except during a run on the AWB. We stress that attentive 
customers could perceive themselves gaining more than they lost. After the introduction of re-
ceipts, the option to withdraw the old way was “in the money” only during a run, yet exercising 
traditional withdrawal created large runs. Eliminating the individually superior yet collectively 
dangerous strategy (traditional withdrawal) left a feasible limit on the extent of a run (the stock 
of receipts), so giving up the option made individuals better off, as long as others also relin-
quished their option. In the tight-knit world of Dutch political economy, such collective under-
standings were not uncommon. For example, provincial governments repeatedly but informally 
suspended sovereign debt payments during crises with little creditor outcry (Gelderblom and 
Jonker 2010). 
Of course, reducing the threat of runs created new incentives for the AWB that customers 
might not have foreseen; these are described below. Finally, moving to receipts and away from 
traditional withdrawal also meant abandoning the AWB’s original symbiosis with Dutch coins. 
That separation, however, had already begun in 1680 when the Dutch Republic introduced the 
gulden: a silver coin worth one current guilder. The gulden set a new standard for the Republic’s 
basic circulating coin, but that standard had no official price at the AWB. The absence of statu-
                                                 
18 Exactly when redeemability was abolished is unknown. To quote van Dillen (1934, 101): “to that great change no 
ordinance nor any precise date can be assigned.” Indirect evidence, described in Section 4, indicates that redeemabil-
ity had been de facto abolished by 1685.  
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tory bank-to-current guilder exchange rate freed the bank’s hands to influence the market agio 
through its policies. 
3. Data  
Researchers interested in the activities of modern central banks have access to copious 
amounts of data. The Federal Reserve System, for example, publishes its balance sheet on a 
weekly basis (the H.4.1 release) and publishes daily data on the market price of its liabilities (the 
effective fed funds rate). Some studies have even examined records of individual transactions 
over central banks’ payment systems (for Fedwire, see e.g., Bartolini et al. 2008; Furfine 1999, 
2001, 2003, 2006; McAndrews and Potter 2002; McAndrews and Rajan 2000) to analyze money 
market activity. Almost incredibly, much of this same information is preserved for the Bank of 
Amsterdam. This section introduces the data used in our investigations.
19 
Turning first to balance sheet data, complete balance sheets for the AWB (totaling both as-
sets and liabilities) are only available at a yearly frequency.
20 However, the ledgers of the bank, 
available at the Amsterdam Municipal Archives, record every transaction in AWB funds over a 
given period, so we use the ledgers to reconstruct daily time series of movements in bank liabili-
ties, i.e., changes in aggregate stock of AWB money. Money creation (e.g., deposits) and de-
struction (withdrawals) is recorded on ledgers of a bank master account.
21 Similarly detailed re-
cords of the bank’s metallic assets and some determinants of capital (fee revenues, expenses, and 
open market profits) have not survived for our period of interest, but some assumptions allow us 
to construct monthly capital-to-asset ratios in line with known annual figures.  
                                                 
19 The data are described in detail in Appendix A. 
20 These were calculated at the end of every January when the bank was closed to reconcile accounts. See Van Dil-
len (1925). 
21 The Specie Kamer or “coin room.”  
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Loan assets can be reconstructed at the daily level. Lending to the East India Company in 
particular is easily detected using a “Furfine algorithm”: VOC loans appear as large debit entries 
to the bank’s master account (credits to the VOC), for large sums in round numbers, and (princi-
pal) repayments as similar credit entries.
22 Potential open market operations are more problem-
atic. A given debit entry to the bank’s master account, for example, may represent an open mar-
ket purchase, or simply a deposit. Still, we can identify some likely episodes of open market in-
terventions with the help of a second Furfine algorithm, described below. 
With the loss of most early ledgers, a reasonably continuous series of extant ledgers only 
begins in 1666, so our data set starts then. We end in 1702 to capture 35 years of activity sur-
rounding 1683.
 We focus only on transactions that change the stock of bank guilders. Even so, 
we have encoded 20,000 individual master account debit transactions (those that created bank 
guilders through the deposit of metal, purchase of metal, or new lending). Credit transactions 
(withdrawals, sales, or loan repayments) produced 17,000 individual transactions. To gain visual 
clarity and compatibility with the agio data, data have been aggregated into monthly observa-
tions: levels being the start of a month and flows being month finish less month start. 420 
monthly observations are available over the sample period of 444 months.
 23 
Available price data are less complete, but nonetheless extensive. The time series we use is 
a set of monthly (presumably, average) observations on the market price of bank money (i.e., the 
agio), spliced together from two sources. The first is an augmented and unpublished version of 
the agio series in McCusker (1978), generously provided to us by John McCusker. The second is 
from the records of Joseph Deutz, a prominent Amsterdam merchant, available at the Amsterdam 
                                                 
22 A nearly identical method, pioneered by Furfine (1999), has been used by researchers to filter interbank loan 
transactions from modern large-value payment system data (e.g., fed funds transactions from Fedwire data). 
23 Six half-years are missing out of the 70 half-years covered here. Missing periods are February-July 1673, Febru-
ary-July 1677, September 1682-January 1683, August 1684-January 1685, September 1697-January 1698, and Sep-




24 The McCusker data cover our whole period, while the Deutz data run 
from 1662 to 1688. Combining the two data sources yields 290 monthly observations. For some 
of our econometric exercises (e.g., VARs), the agio series was interpolated to a full sample using 
a related series, the London price of Amsterdam bills reported in McCusker (1978).
25 
Agios are quoted in sixteenths of a guilder, attesting to the liquidity of the market for bank 
funds. A sixteenth of a guilder also represented the typical profit margin for a cashier on a bank 
money trade (Steuart 1805, 405). 
3.1. Balances and the Agio 
The basic data on quantity (AWB balances) and price (agio) are presented in figures 2 and 
3. The gaps in the balance series follow from time’s decimation of records. Also, to focus on the 
routine, figure 3 truncates the very low agio values observed during the 1672 French invasion 
and very high agio observations in 1693.
26 Interpolated values of the agio are shown as dotted 
lines in figure 3. Vertical lines in the charts mark the initiation of the receipt system. 
                                                 
24 Amsterdam Municipal Archives inventory numbers 234 / 290 through 295. 
25 See Appendix A for the details of the interpolation. 
26 The early 1693 spike in the agio resulted from a widely anticipated, legally mandated devaluation of two coins, 
the schelling and the 28-stuiver, that had become severely debased (Mees 1838, 113-114). The coins circulated as 
current money but were not eligible for deposit at the AWB. The devaluations were for 7 and 8 percent respectively, 
causing the agio to temporarily run as high as 13 percent (the usual 5 percent premium of bank money above current 
money plus the amount of the anticipated devaluation).  
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Figure 2: Monthly AWB balances 1666:2-1703:2 
Source: See Appendix A. 
Figure 3. Agio, by month, 1666:2-1703:2 
Source: See Appendix A. 
3.2 The AWB’s uses of funds 
The first step in analyzing the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet was to strip out VOC 




























































Figure 4. VOC loan balances (principal) by month, 1666:2-1703:2 
Source: See Appendix A. 
Lending to the VOC was an important activity of the bank, both before and after 1683 (Uit-
tenbogaard, 2009). The Amsterdam city council authorized a credit line of 1.7 million in 1682 
(Mees 1838, 196), but figure 4 shows that this limit had already been breached in practice. The 
peak level of VOC indebtedness does not increase after 1683, but the data clearly show that 
multi-year bank credit to the VOC fell away after 1683 while short-term trough-to-peaks grew. 
The data challenges are more severe for non-VOC uses of funds. Bank records say nothing 
about what collateral changed hands when bank guilders were created or destroyed, but the bank 
did use different accounting channels for different types of transactions. We have identified one 
channel for coin deposits and another channel for bullion purchases. Essentially, coin deposits 
are routed through the accounts of the bank’s clerical staff, while purchases (i.e., sales of bal-
ances) appear directly as debit entries to the bank’s master account (see Appendix A for details). 
Metal sales by the bank (purchases of balances) do not have a distinct accounting channel, 
so these sales are (somewhat more tentatively) proxied using another Furfine algorithm: round 
guilder transactions are assigned as “coin withdrawals” and transactions with fractional amounts 
to “bullion sales.” We describe coins as being deposited and withdrawn because the bank was 



































was defined in terms of official coin prices and that altering such prices undermined the collat-
eral structure of all balances. In contrast, the bank had latitude regarding bullion (including non-
official coins, metal wire, etc.), and the bank routinely violated what restrictions had been placed 
on the buying and selling of bullion (van Dillen 1934, 92-3). 
Based on this sorting of transactions, much of the increase in balances after 1683 came 
through more coin deposits. And, as would follow from lower withdrawal fees, there were also 
more coin withdrawals. Figure 5 presents the amount of coin deposits and withdraws by month 
from February 1666 to January 1703. Inflow and outflow deepened considerably after the regime 
change. Note that post-1683 inflows roughly mirror outflows, providing some confirmation for 
the algorithm used to identify coin withdrawals. 
Figure 5. Monthly Coin Deposits and Withdrawals, 1666:2 to 1703:2 
 
Source: See Appendix A. Note that June 1672 Coin Withdrawals is truncated: the observation’s value is -2,478,372 
bank guilders. 
If the fee reduction facilitated withdrawals (and therefore more deposits), it should also 
have promoted smaller yet more frequent withdrawals. To check this, figure 6 plots annual with-
drawal transactions against the average withdrawal size. By drawing a line at 5,000 guilders, one 
clearly sees that withdrawal transactions jump after 1683: the outlier being the crisis year of 
1672 behaving similarly to a typical year under the receipt system. Withdrawal size shows a 
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Figure 7. Monthly Bullion Purchases and Sales, 1666:2 to 1703:2 
Source: Appendix A. 
To finish our partial reconstruction of asset side of the AWB’s balance sheet, the series 
shown in Figures 5 and 7 must be integrated over time to obtain series on cumulated deposits and 
cumulated purchases. Since there are no initial values for these two component series, some 
normalizing assumption is required. We conservatively set the bank’s February 1666 purchases 
to zero, and set the initial value for cumulated deposits to be the entire stock of bank balances, 
excluding VOC loans. The two series are graphed together in Figure 8. The pre-1683 era shows 
that the stagnation of bank balances involved a long decline in deposits and an offsetting rise in 
the purchases.
 28 After 1683, deposits were the driving force behind the expansion of bank bal-
ances.
29 The receipt system was a way to arrest the long term decline in deposits.
30  
                                                 
28 The decline of deposits likely began in the 1650s when the long-term growth in AWB balances ended. Quinn and 
Roberds (2009a) argues that the stabilization of the monetary system in the 1650s obviated the AWB’s original role 
of protecting creditors from poor coinage, so demand for deposits slackened. 
29 Post-1683, cumulated purchases would approximate “outright purchases” of assets on a modern central bank’s 
balance sheet, while cumulated deposits would (again quite roughly) correspond to “repurchase agreements.” 







































Figure 8. Cumulated Net Deposits and Bullion Purchases, 1666:2 to 1703:2 
 
Source: Appendix A. 
3.3 Summary statistics  
Table 3 reports statistics on the data series before and after the 1683 regime change. 
Table 3. Statistics on the Agio and AWB Balances  
Series Sample  () x μ   () x σ   () x μ Δ   () x σ Δ   () Kx  ( ) Kx Δ  
Agio (percent) 
1666:2-1683:7  3.89  0.458  0.007 0.256 
5.69
** 1.04 
1683:8-1703:2  4.83  0.530  0.067 0.407 
Total balances 
(million guilder) 




1683:8-1703:2  12.51  2.41  0.004 0.586 
VOC Loan Princi-
pal 




1683:8-1703:2  .592  .623  0.001 .474 
Deposits 




1683:8-1703:2  5.27  2.15  0.011 0.363 
Purchases 




1683:8-1703:2  6.43  0.656  -0.006  0.188 
Source: see Appendix A. Statistics for the agio omit two episodes of outliers: June-October 1672 and January-
February 1693. K denotes the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the null hypothesis of equality of 






































The table indicates that after 1683 the agio fluctuated around its approximate statutory 
level of 5 percent; it also becomes more variable. The distribution of first differences in the agio 
does not change significantly across samples, i.e., there is no change in “smoothness” of the agio 
after 1683. Balances increase due to accumulated metal purchases and an influx of deposits. Out-
standing loans to the VOC average about the same before and after 1683, but these become less 
smooth after the reform. Purchases are notably less variable after the 1683 reform. 
The empirical literature on the founding of the Federal Reserve (see Section 5) emphasizes 
changes in seasonal patterns for certain macro series around the time the Fed began operations in 
1914. With these results in mind, we conducted three exercises to see whether the AWB’s 1683 
reform resulted in similar changes. The first exercise was to simply calculate monthly means for 
the agio and the three monetary component series; these are shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Monthly means (percent deviation from annual means) 
 
There is little visual evidence of seasonality in the series for the agio and purchases, either before 
or after 1683. Monthly means for deposits display less seasonality after the regime change, while 
VOC debt becomes highly seasonal. These patterns were confirmed in a second, more formal 


































mies in each equation of  a VAR model (described in more detail in section 4) for the four series. 
Deterministic aseasonality is rejected at conventional significance levels for VOC purchases and 
deposits, but accepted for the agio and purchase series. This pattern holds before and after 1683 
The third exercise was to estimate spectra for the four data series in order to check for inde-
terministic seasonality; these are shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Estimated spectral densities (log scales) 
 
The most striking feature of figure 10 is that the spectrum for VOC balances displays well-
defined maxima centered around seasonal frequencies of  /6 π ,  /3 π  ,and 2/ 3 π  (12-month and 
harmonic cycles), post-1683. Seasonality for the other series is relatively modest and there are no 
great differences across subsamples. 
Summarizing the results of this section, initial exploration of the data suggests that the 
post-1683 regime was characterized by higher flows and levels of deposits, somewhat less vari-
able purchases, a higher average agio, and more seasonal and regular borrowing on the part of 
Agio, 1666:2-1683:7
Fractions of pi







































































31 The next section investigates to what extent these observed changes can be attributed 
to changes in policy. 
4. The impact of policy changes 
To market participants at the time, receipts were the only obvious discontinuity in the func-
tion of the AWB after 1683. As before, the bank continued to serve as a trusted settlement ser-
vice provider and as a (surreptitious) financial intermediary to the VOC. Convertibility of depos-
its was limited, but money could easily be traded for coin on the open market, much as before. 
Where then were the gains associated with the adoption of a fiat standard? 
Our answer, in essence, is that placing restrictions on withdrawals allowed Amsterdam to 
partly escape the opportunity costs of a system of exchange based on commodity money (e.g., 
Sargent and Wallace 1983), as compared to a system with either greater availability of credit, or 
fiat money. To be certain, some amount of commodity money was essential for the functioning 
of a seventeenth-century open economy. A great entrepôt of its day, Amsterdam was where 
Europe purchased goods from Asia and other points east with silver unearthed in the Americas 
(de Vries and van der Woude 1997). Over time, Amsterdam also became the center of the Euro-
pean bullion trade. 
However, the data shown in figure 5 indicate that before 1683, the bulk of the metal back-
ing for AWB deposits rarely entered or left at the monthly frequency, so the high cost of with-
drawing funds from the bank meant that the principal purpose of this metal was to confer value 
to the bank guilder. Over the longer term (figure 8), withdrawals outpaced deposits, but the 
AWB chose to offset this trend with purchases, so overall balances remained stable (figure 3). 
                                                 
31 Available data indicate that the regime change seems to have had virtually no impact on trend inflation. Annual 
price indices for the Netherlands (van Zanden, 2004) show an average yearly deflation of 0.38% from 1666 to 1684 
and 0.30% from 1684 to 1702.  
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The prospect of seven million guilders’ worth of metal simply sitting in the bank’s vault must 
have tempted even the most ardent hard-money advocates. The 1683 reform nudged the AWB’s 
functionality somewhat closer to that of a modern central bank. 
4.1 Credit policy 
The AWB’s early lending activities represented a partial shift to an asset-backed currency. 
As long as all deposits were convertible, however, the bank learned to be reluctant about extend-
ing credit much in excess of its capital position. Either the bank exposed itself to the risk of a run 
by lowering its metal-to-deposit ratio, or it financed lending from its own capital, or a combina-
tion of the two. Alternatively, the bank could slacken its liquidity constraints by imposing higher 
withdrawal fees as it did in 1672, but this discouraged deposits and imposed costs on market 
participants. We will now elucidate how the bank lent more frequently with less capital cushion 
after 1683.
32 To do so requires a discussion of the bank’s relationship with the City of Amster-
dam. 
The bank’s activities as financial intermediary were closely constrained by its relationship 
with the city. After the VOC, the city was the bank’s other major borrower, if borrower is the 
correct term.
33 Figure 11 shows the evolution of the city’s debt over the sample period. In the 
early 1650s, the city had borrowed 2 million guilders in metal from its bank, and soon afterwards 
the city stopped paying interest on the loan and never again paid interest on its debt. Figure 11 
shows this debt still on the books in 1666 through 1683. In 1683, the city began taking out more 
metal, in grey, and occasionally paying some of it back, but these metallic loans did not create 
                                                 
32 See Appendix B for a formal model of the changeover in the bank’s credit operations. 
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1795, the city had taken 6.5 million guilders from the bank (our calculation). The only indication 
of this in the traditional series is the bank’s occasional write-off of loans until book capital 
neared zero: 2.3 million guilders in 1685 and 170,000 guilers in 1691 (Willemsen 2009, 85). 
Limiting the right of withdrawal allowed the city take metal and the bank admit (at least to itself) 
to having no capital. 
Figure 12. Adjusted Asset Ratios, by Month, 1666 to 1703 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using van Dillen (1925, 701-97, 971-84) and our data set. 
Figure 12 also plots a loan-to-asset ratio which, after removing municipal takings and their 
subsequent write-offs, leaves mostly variations in VOC borrowing. In the first half of our period, 

























































































monthly loan/asset ratio averaged 16 percent (our calculation). With the regime change, peak 
lending did not change (figure 4), but the loan/asset ratio declined to a 7 percent average because 
loans did not linger and because the deposit base grew (figure 8).  
The increase in seasonal lending meant that the VOC increased its use of the AWB as a 
regular supplier of operating credit. The bank was a major lender to the VOC because it enjoyed 
certain advantages: its perpetual nature,
35 its political position,
36 and its privileged position in bill 
settlement. But the VOC also had direct access to the Dutch bond market and averaged a total 
year-end debt of 10 million current guilders over our sample period.
37 The strong seasonality, 
especially after 1683, suggests that the VOC valued the AWB as an overdraft facility to acquire 
metal to ship to Asia.
 38   
Some confirmation of this can be detected from surviving records of the VOC. De Korte 
(1984) collected annual VOC balance sheets that give levels at the start of a fiscal year (usually 
May 31) for assets such as cash, credits, and the inventory of unsold goods; and for liabilities 
(primarily corporate debt). Better still, three flow variables are also known for the fiscal year: 
expenditures paid, dividends paid and revenues collected.
39 An OLS estimation reported in Table 
4 calculates how these variables correlate with our dependent variable of interest, the amount the 
                                                 
35 The 1609 charter of the bank contained no “sunset date.” This contrasts with say, the First Bank of the United 
States, which received a 20-year charter. 
36 During the period we analyze, the AWB was governed by a board of commissioners, comprised of three or four 
prominent individuals such as former mayors (‘t Hart, 2009). 
37 See Appendix A, Table A10. 
38 The regime change of 1683, however, does not explain the end of multi-year lending by the bank to the VOC. 
That change coincides with structural changes in the VOC’s corporate debt following from the crisis of 1672 (de 
Korte 1984, 66). At the start of our sample, 1666, the VOC’s long-term debt was in the form of bonds callable at par 
by either debtor or creditors. The VOC had a program of retiring long-term debt in 1670 until the crisis in 1672, and 
the lack of borrowing in Figure 4 for those years is evident. During the 1672 crisis, the VOC suspended the call 
option, and in the years that followed restructured its debt to avoid this problem. First, the VOC began offering 
short-term anticipations that gave a senior claim on auction proceeds from the next fleet to arrive. Then the company 
issued long-term debt without creditor call options. The bubble of multi-year borrowing (figure 4) from 1676 to 
1682 appears to have been part of the VOC’s debt restructuring. 
39 All are measured in current guilders, and all are for operation in the Netherlands. Ships at sea and operations in 
Asia are excluded.  
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VOC borrowed that year from the AWB.
40 Expenditures during a year strongly and positively 
correlate with borrowing, and suggest a derived demand for AWB loans of 25 percent of VOC 
expenditures. In contrast, information about that year’s sales revenue lacks explanatory power. 
These results agree with the idea that the VOC was borrowing to outfit ships before the year’s 
fleet returned from Asia, and about half of equipment costs were coins (Korte 1998, 16). 
Table 4. VOC Correlates to AWB Lending, 1666 to 1702 
Dependent Variable: AWB LENDING in Bank Guilders 
 
Independent Variables in Current Guilders. 
 
 Coefficient  t-Statistic  p-value 
Flow Variables      
1. EXPENDITURES  0.243575  2.854951  0.0079 
2. DIVIDENDS  0.086721  0.588119  0.5610 
3. SALES  0.001038  0.013216  0.9895 
      
Levels at Year-Start       
4. INVENTORY  -0.057136  -1.495904  0.1455 
5. CASH  -0.158387  -0.823348  0.4170 
6. CREDIT DUE  -0.402999  -1.614495  0.1172 
7. TOTAL DEBT  -0.006557  -0.141776  0.8882 
      
N= 36    Adjusted R-squared  0.365084 
   Durbin-Watson  1.778873 
 
Source: See Appendix A. 
 
Given the relationship between AWB lending and VOC expenditures, the economic benefit 
from expanded seasonal lending should have been expanded VOC investment in expeditions. To 
visually check this, Figure 13 plots for each of our sample years VOC expenditures on the hori-
zontal and AWB lending to the VOC on the vertical. While noisy, more expenditures do seem to 
follow an expanded credit policy by the AWB: the series’ simple correlation is +0.56. Unfortu-
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receipts (1666 to 1683) and 16 percent for our years after (1683 through 1702). The bank could 
do more with less because of the surge in demand for receipts and fiat bank money.  
4.2 Monetary policy 
The original and overriding policy goal of the Bank of Amsterdam was to maintain a stable 
value of bank balances—the settlement medium for financial transactions within the city. The 
pre-1683 monetary regime partially fulfilled this goal by eliminating the inflationary trend that 
prevailed in the early decades of the seventeenth century. However, a defect of this regime was a 
persistent “undervaluation” of bank money: high withdrawal fees meant that the market value of 
the agio could fall as much as 1.5% below its statutory value before triggering a corrective mar-
ket response (see figures 3 and 5). Figure 14 plots the empirical density of the agio and indicates 
that before 1683, its market value rarely approached its statutory level of about 5 percent. 
Figure 14. Estimated densities for the agio 
 
Source: see Appendix A. Estimated densities are histograms, smoothed with Gaussian weights. Outlier values are 
not shown. Shaded area is the post-1683 target zone suggested by van Dillen (1934). 
The post-1683 regime was associated with higher levels of the agio, but it is not clear how 
much of this change in valuation can be attributed to deliberate policy actions by the bank. Van 
Dillen’s (1934, 102) description of the bank’s policy is reminiscent of the operations of a modern 
1666:2-1683:7 1683:8-1703:2








currency board: “… for many years [after 1683], they bought in bank money when the agio fell 
to 4 1/4 percent and sold whenever it rose to 4 7/8 percent.” As can be seen from figure 14, how-
ever, the data are not consistent with a simple “currency board” characterization: most of the 
time the market agio lies outside its putative target band (shaded). Moreover, there is evidence 
suggesting that much of the post-1683 change in the behavior of the agio was simply the result of 
arbitrage. We now consider this evidence in more detail. 
4.2.1 Agio arbitrage 
To illustrate coin-to-bank money arbitrage, we consider the two coins that anchored the 
Dutch system of trade coins: the silver dukaat and the silver rijder.
41 Mint data on these coins is 
reported Polak (1998), and Table 5 gives some basic information for each coin. 
Table 5. Implied Agios for Two Silver Trade Coins 
  Dukaat  Rijder 
Statutory Values    
        in current guilders  2.5  3.15 
        in bank guilders  2.4  3.0 
    
Implied deposit (statutory) agio () α    4.17% 5.00% 
    




α + ⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
     
        with w = 1.5%  2.63%  3.45% 
         with w = 1.5%, and 
         a rijder-specific fee of 1%   2.44% 
         with w = 0.25%  3.91%  4.74% 
    
Source: Polak (1998, 73-4). 
The mint ordinance assigned two values to each coin.
42 The ratio of the current guilder 
value over the bank guilder value (less 1) gives the implied statutory agio α for each coin. If the 
                                                 















+ ⎛⎞ ≡− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
, (1) 
if the coin is to reside in the bank. Table 5 reports the upper and lower steady-state boundaries 
for each coin assuming w = 1.5%. A market agio above 4.17 would encourage the deposit of 
dukaten, an agio below 3.45 would encourage the withdrawal of rijders, and an agio in between 
would create no arbitrage incentives. Recall also that the AWB could assess an additional fee on 
popular coins at withdrawal, so an additional premium could reduce the rijder’s lower bound to 
match the dukaat’s lower bound. Thus, for the pre-1683 period, the two-coin steady-state interval 
(intersection of the single-coin intervals) would have been ( ) 2.5%; 4.17% αα ==. Figure 14 
shows that the agio rarely fell below the lower bound during this period, but often moved beyond 
the upper bound. The agio distribution shifts rightward after 1683, but its overall shape and up-
per-bound violations were retained. Let us consider why the distribution changed in this fashion. 
4.2.2 Agio mean 
The 1683 reduction in fees forced a change in the agio’s steady-state equilibrium. A fee of 
0.25 percent (the new standard for silver coins) caused each coin’s arbitrage bounds to tighten. 
Returning to the dukaat and the rijder (table 5), no market agio now existed at which both coins 
could remain free of arbitrage pressures. For example, an agio of 4.5 would encourage the de-
posit of dukaten (pushing down the agio) and the withdrawal of rijders (pushing up the agio). 
Low fees pushed a corner solution: either the agio would settle around 4 percent when the AWB 
                                                                                                                                                             
42 Ordinances also assigned each coin a metal content that could affect the steady state properties of the agio, but this 
issue does not pertain when the price of silver is within a coin’s mint equivalent and mint price. For a full analysis, 
see appendix C.  
43 After 1683, the cost of a withdrawal would include the market value of a receipt. Hence in practice the agio could 
fall slightly below the lower endpoint in (1) without violating no-arbitrage.   
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ran out of rijders or it would settle around 5 percent when the stock of circulating coins ran out 
of dukaten. 
The post-1683 density of agio in figure 14 shows that higher range predominated. We can-
not say if the AWB intended for the lower fees to push the agio to a new center, but the bank did 
accept the new reality. For example, in January 1687, the AWB switched the agio it used for 
internal record keeping from 4.25 to 5.
44 Similarly, for the three-gulden, a coin very similar to 
the rijder, the AWB chose an agio of 5.26 percent.
45 
The shift to a higher agio is surprising at first glance, for the transition period began with 
no rijder receipts and no arbitrage incentive to create them. Indeed, the agio remained around 4 
percent until 1685. The answer is to also note that the new regime created an increased demand 
for deposits, but mint ordinances favored the production of rijders.
 46 The two coins had the same 
official mint price, but rijders had a seigniorage rate of 1 percent while the dukaat’s rate was 0.2 
percent.
47  
To see that profits mattered, figure 15 plots the production of dukaten and rijders by the six 
Dutch provincial mints from the introduction of the two coins in 1659 to the advent of receipts in 
1683.
48 It shows rijder production outpacing dukaat by 2 to 1. Dukaat production is largely lim-
ited to the introductory period just after 1659
49 and a surge in emergency minting (much of it by 
the government) during 1672 and 1673. The rijder also sees emergency minting in 1673.  
 
                                                 
44 Amsterdam Municipal Archives inventory number 5077/1322, f. 9. 
45 The AWB recorded 3-gulden coins at 2.85 bank guilders (AMA 5077/1322, f. 43). 
46 With a low mint equivalent, dukaten were also favored for export. 
47 As of the 1668 mint ordinance, both coins had a mint price of 24.873 guilders per mark (Polak 1998, 174-5). The 
mint equivalents were 24.933 for the dukaat and 25.131 for the rijder. 
48 The series does not capture all Dutch mint production, and incorporates smoothing of some multi-year production 
figures, so it is more indicative than exhaustive. 
49 From 1659 to 1668, the dukaat was subsidized in that in that the States General taxed rijder production at 0.158 
guilders per mark and dukaat production at 0.026 guilders per mark (Polak 1998, 174-5). This tax ended in 1688.  
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Figure 15. Annualized Production at Provincial Mints 
 
Source: Derived from Polak (1998, 103-164). 
The paucity of dukaat coins limited the ability of AWB customers to favorably deposit du-
katen as the agio rose above 4.17 percent. At the same time, the new regime promoted deposits, 
so rijders dominated. To show this, figure 16 plots a measure of the types of coins deposited 
through use of yet another filtering algorithm: one built around sacks of coins. The 200 coin sack 
was the standard bulk unit, so a sack of dukaat coins was worth 480 bank guilders and a sack of 
rijders 600 bank guilders. We filtered the population of deposit transactions for amounts of ex-
actly 480, 600, or their multiples up to times ten. Each observation is then converted into sacks, 
so, for example, 960 bank guilders converts into two sacks of dukaten. The sacks are then aggre-
gated by month, and the joint-multiples of 2,400 and 4,800 are excluded. The result, Figure 16, 




















































































deposits did respond to arbitrage opportunities. When the agio flirted with 5 percent in 1670 and 
1671, dukaten were attracted, but the much larger effect was the in-rush of rijders.  
Figure 16. Filtered Sample of Deposits by Month by Coin 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
To summarize this sub-section, the tremendous drop in fees in 1683 created an arbitrage-
induced corner solution. The rijder equilibrium won because the importance of agio-arbitrage 
was conditional on the minting environment. Few dukaat coins were in circulation at the time to 
meet the surge in demand for deposits, so the mean agio eventually moved towards the rijder’s 
implicit agio of 5 percent.
50  
                                                 
50 The scarcity of dukaten also helps explain the asymmetry in agio observations above the du-










































































































































4.2.3 Agio dispersion 
If the rijder’s no-arbitrage boundaries set the agio’s trading range, then the reduction in 
fees in 1683 should have tightened the range (see Table 5), and the agio’s variance should have 
also tightened. It did not until after 1693. Again, we think minting can help explain the high 
agios from 1685 to 1693.  
From 1676 to 1693, some mints, especially Zeeland’s provincial mint, began producing 
coins with higher mint prices than traditional dukaten or rijders.
51 These “light” coins were an 
effort to gain revenue.
52 To get a sense of this, figure 17 plots the production of silver at the pro-
vincial mints in the form of traditional coins (dukaat, rijder, and gulden) and as the new, rival 
coins (arendsdaalder and florijn).
53 The lighter (high mint equivalent) coins were displacing 
traditional coins until Holland refused to recognize their legal status in 1690, and the entire 
United Provinces banned their production in 1694.
54  
                                                 
51 These new coins were large trade coins distinct from the small schellingen and stuivers referenced in footnote 26. 
52 A different version of the problem was the province of Overijssel debasing gulden coins in the late 1680s. 
53 Again, the caveats in footnote 48 apply.  
54 The data also suggest that sorting out the monetary uncertainty stimulated new minting.  
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Figure 17. Annualized Trade Coin Production at Provincial Mints 
 
Source: Derived from Polak (1998, 103-164). 
The new coins undermined the silver content of circulating current money, so the agio rose 
to historic highs. The AWB returned to its original role of sheltering creditors as agio-arbitrage 
and low fees encouraged deposits of rijders and dukaten (figure 16). The agio got so high that it 
paid to mint dukaat coins just to deposit them at the AWB.
55 The agio peaked at 12.5 percent in 
January 1693 and hovered around 6.25 during the third quarter of 1693. Dukaat production at the 
provincial mints
56 surged in 1693 and 1694, and we think the high agio drove the activity be-
cause rijder production did not surge. Again, rijders usually dominated production (figure 15). 
The dukaat’s only advantage was an attractive agio when deposited at the AWB (table 5). 
                                                 
55 This effect does not include the Zeeland dukaat. In 1672, Zeeland raised the ordinance value of its dukaat to 2.55 
current guilders (Polak 1985, 73). With the end of arensdaalders in 1694, Zeeland switched to minting these “cried-
up” dukaten. 
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After 1693, observed agios stabilize between 5.25 and 4.38 for the rest of our sample pe-
riod.
57 The high agios in our post-1683 sample reflect instability in the quality of current coins 
that gets sorted out in 1694. Otherwise, the agio distribution stays centered on the arbitrage 
boundaries set by the rijder coin. 
4.3 Open market operations 
The presence of arbitrage effects does not exclude the possibility that the bank sought to in-
fluence the agio through open market operations. Historical accounts (van Dillen, Mees, and 
others) agree that such operations occurred but are mute regarding their manner and extent. Our 
reconstruction of master account transactions points to the AWB buying and selling bullion 
rather than coin. Open market operations meant that the AWB would sell (buy) bullion below 
(above) the market price and decrease (increase) the quantity of bank guilders. 
To what end? The AWB could attempt to stabilize the agio. Alternatively, the bank could 
mute the impact of fluctuations in bank money by offsetting deposits with bullion sales and 
withdrawals with bullion purchases, i.e., the bank could “sterilize” these flows in modern par-
lance (see, e.g., Hamilton 1997). The bank could similarly sterilize changes in VOC credit. This 
section presents evidence that the bank used bullion operations to pursue all three goals, and that 
the fiat money standard facilitated these operations by allowing more aggressive bullion sales. 
                                                 
57 Our interpolated agios in Figure 3 are erratic around 1696 because the pound-bank guilder exchange reflected 
great monetary difficulties in England. England was experiencing a liquidity crisis as the Great Recoinage, begun in 
1695, temporarily reduced the stock of circulating coins. For example, the Bank of England suspended convertibility 
in 1696 (Clapham 1944, 36).  
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4.3.1 Operations in bullion 
Why trade bullion rather than coin?
58 Trading coin would have violated the bank’s funda-
mental assignment of respecting and maintaining the mint ordinance values of coins. In contrast, 
bullion could be traded without necessarily upsetting the circulation of coins at all. To see this, 
suppose that a coin from the preceding section contains b ounces of silver. Also, note that when 
mints offer to convert silver to coin, they collect a fraction σ of the silver as seigniorage. If we 
take the market agio as a and we normalize the coin’s face value to unity, then the steady-state 











The bank had to take these limits into account in its open market operations if it did not want to 
disrupt the circulation of coins. 
The 1683 reform eased these constraints. Receipts allowed the AWB to purchase existing 
options to withdraw coins, so the stock of potentially circulating coins could be reduced without 
the bank offering an unofficial price. Lower fees also allowed the AWB to more easily “tighten” 
by selling bullion. To see the effect of lower fees on the range of bullion sale prices, insert the 
lower bound () a  for the agio in (1) into (2) to get bounds on the steady-state price of silver γ 












++ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. (3) 
                                                 
58 Why not trade in government debt? Holland had no secondary market for sovereign debt in this era (Gelderblom 
and Jonker 2010). 
59 I.e., γ lies in an interval formed by the mint price of the coin and the mint equivalent of the coin, converted to 
bank guilders at the market agio. See e.g., Redish (1990), Sargent and Smith (1997), or Sargent and Velde (2003) on 




The decrease in w decreased the lower bound  ( ) [ ] 1( 1 ) / ( 1 ) wb a γσ =− + +  in (3), allowing the 
AWB to more easily sell bullion at a price above the mint’s purchase price.  
Receipts also eliminated the need for coin-specific premia by ending cross-coin substitu-
tion. To see why, assume two coins with (bank) nominal value/metal pairings of () 11 , x b and 











 to avoid 
coin-to-coin arbitrage. The receipt system avoided the problem by making all withdrawal claims 
a claim to a specific coin. All together, lower fees simultaneously tightened the agio () a ↑  and 
eased the bank’s ability to sell bullion ( ) γ ↓  when the agio was low: near a . Also note that the 
effect is asymmetric, for reducing fees does not alter a , (i.e., the upper bound in (1)) or γ  (the 
upper bound in (3)) when the agio is high. 
4.3.2 Evidence of open market operations 
Returning to the data, the integrated series on purchases and deposits, graphed in Figure 8, 
provide a narrative to the bank’s open market activity. Before 1683, open market activity seems 
to have had a defensive character. “Reserves” of metal were accumulated by large purchases at 
favorable times. Purchased metal was rarely drawn down through sales, the chief exception be-
ing the years 1680-83, by which point virtually no coin was being deposited (see Figure 5) and 
cumulated deposits were approximately zero (Figure 8). After 1683, infrequent spikes in pur-
chases continue as before, but these are followed by lengthy periods over which the bank is a net 
seller of metal (1685-87, 1691-94, 1695-98, 1699 onward). By then the bank apparently felt 
more comfortable parting with its metal purchases than it did before the 1683 reform. 




Table 6. Potential Large Open Market Operations 
5a. Bullion Purchases/ Sales of Bank Money 
Month Size  (guilders)  Size 
(% total balances)  Agio 
Compared to  
Agios  
+/- 12 months 
May-68 1,437,506.25  24%  4.00  Highest 
Aug-70 815,231.20  12%  4.72  High 
Sep-70 1,415,986.48  18%  4.90  High 
Dec-79 994,726.08  17%  4.47  Highest 
Feb-80 807,539.45  10%  4.44  High 
Oct-85 1,909,653.70  29%  5.13  High 
May-94 1,022,275.45  9%  4.69  Low 
Oct-98 706,765.30  5%  5.00  High 
Nov-98 899,359.70  6%  5.19  High 
 
5b. Bullion Sales/ Purchases of Bank Money 
Month Size  (guilders)  Size 
(% total balances)  Agio 
Compared to 
Agios 
+/- 12 months 
Nov-67 340,681.90  5%  3.19  Lowest 
Sep-70 573,082.22  7%  4.90  High 
Nov-75 308,633.05  6%  3.53  Low 
Nov-77 409,548.10  7%  3.75  Low 
Nov-81 501,789.50  7%  3.63  Low 
Dec-86 612,842.55  6%  5.25  High 
May-91 450,312.75  4%  5.25  Low 
Nov-94 300,312.27  2%  4.75  Low 
 
Notes: Operations are classified as “large” if they are more than 3 standard deviations above the series mean. Agios 




A case-by-case examination indicates that these exceptional transactions almost always 
leaned against the wind: metal was purchased during periods of high agios, and vice versa.
60 In 
addition, the AWB’s large purchases are often approximately offset by large deposit outflows, 
and vice-versa for large sales. Net purchases and net deposits almost exactly line up on a nega-
tively sloped 45º line for many high-value observations, both before and after 1683 (figure 18), 
consistent with the hypothesis that these were essentially sterilization operations. 
Figure 18: Net Purchases versus Net Deposits (Bank Guilders) 
 
Source: Appendix A. 
Offsetting of purchases and balances is confirmed in a more formal exercise in which a 
standard vector autoregression was fit to the four principal data series (the agio, VOC debt, cu-
mulated deposits, and cumulated purchases). The VAR was fit over a sample that includes all 
available observations on balances, except the two outlier episodes in 1672 and 1693. The speci-
fication includes monthly dummies and 2 lags.
61 Stationarity of the model coefficients across the 
                                                 
60 Exceptions are the large bullion purchase in May 1994 and sales in September 1670 and December 1686; how-
ever, these transactions represent partial unwindings of transactions in the opposite direction during the same or 
previous month. 
61 The 2-lag specification is chosen under the Akaike, Hannan-Quinn, and Schwarz criteria; sequential likelihood 














































r = -.36 
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1683 break is strongly rejected by a classical likelihood ratio test (p<.001).
62 36-month impulse 
responses from the two VARs (pre- and post-1683) are graphed in figure 19. Responses shown 
are for a Choleski decomposition of the forecast error variance-covariance matrix with the agio 
first in the ordering. 
63 
Figure 19. Sample impulse responses 
 
 
Noteworthy in figure 19 are the persistently negative responses of purchases to shocks to 
deposits, both before and after 1683, consistent with the idea that the bank’s open market opera-
                                                 
62 Stationarity of coefficients is also rejected under the Akaike and Hannan-Quinn criteria; however stationary is 
favored under the Schwarz criterion. 






























































































































































































































































































































































tions worked to smooth short-term fluctuations in the money stock. Shocks to deposits are less 
persistent after 1683, perhaps reflecting greater efficacy of the bank’s operations after the transi-
tion. Post-1683 shocks to VOC balances also induce sales of metal by the bank, suggesting that 
these fluctuations were partly sterilized. Also of interest are the responses of purchases to shocks 
to the agio. These are persistently positive, implying that the bank added funds to the market 
when bank balances became unexpectedly scarce, and drained funds when money was plentiful. 
Summarizing this section, our analysis suggests that the bank conducted open market op-
erations throughout the sample period, with some purchase operations in particular being quite 
aggressive. There is a strong negative correlation between shocks to deposits and shocks to pur-
chases, indicating that the motivation for many of these operations was to smooth fluctuations in 
the money stock rather than to stabilize the agio. The 1683 regime change both encouraged de-
posit flows and eased arbitrage constraints on the bank, allowing the AWB greater latitude to sell 
off purchased metal. 
 
5. Connections to the literature 
The above analysis invites comparison to similar analyses of U.S. macro time series before 
and after the 1913 founding of the Federal Reserve. Numerous studies (e.g., Clark 1986, Miron 
1986, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil 1987) have documented that U.S. interest rates become ex-
tremely persistent and virtually aseasonal starting in 1914, while monetary aggregates display 
increased seasonality. These changes are often attributed to Federal Reserve policies, especially a 
quasi-pegging of short-term interest rates through the opening of the discount window. 
Figures 5 and 6 show that comparable shifts do not occur around 1683, except in the in-
creased seasonality of VOC loan balances. Constancy in seasonal patterns for the other two  
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components of the money stock is consistent with the more evolutionary nature of the 1683 pol-
icy change, and the AWB’s restriction of seasonal lending to a single counterparty. 
The VAR analysis reported in Canova (1991, 700-701) (see also Tallman and Moen 1998) 
finds that before 1914, external shocks to high-powered money are highly causal for the U.S. 
domestic money stock, but that this same effect is greatly diluted after 1914. We cannot fully 
replicate Canova’s exercise due to data limitations (monthly observations on key macro series 
such as output and prices are unavailable), but figure 15 displays some similarity to the pre-1914 
U.S. case: favorable shocks to the agio (to the extent these originate abroad) have a persistent 
positive impact on money. In contrast to the post-1914 U.S. experience, however, this pattern 
attenuates somewhat but does not disappear after 1683. 
Some aspects of the AWB’s operations resemble those of modern currency boards. E.g., 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has standing offers to sell Hong Kong dollars at a unit price 
of US $0.129 and to repurchase its money at a 1.27% lower price, roughly matching the AWB’s 
pre-1683 statutory bid-ask spread. The receipt system evidently allowed the bank to function 
with a lower “backing ratio” of external assets to central bank money than do modern currency 
boards, which often operate with a backing ratio of 100 percent or more. 
Currency boards can be effective in stabilizing monetary value, but a commonly cited de-
fect is their inability to ward off banking crises (Chang and Velasco 1999, 2000). Yet no wide-
spread banking crises occurred in Amsterdam during the period we analyze. This is perhaps due 
to Amsterdam’s reliance on a web of informal trade credit and personal guarantees (bills of ex-
change) for business financing, rather than deposit banks. And, as has been demonstrated, the 
AWB could and did indirectly ease credit conditions by providing financing to the largest enter-
prise in the economy.  
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In the eighteenth century, Amsterdam expanded its credit markets at the cost of increased 
financial fragility. A system of “acceptance credit” developed, under which bills of exchange 
were guaranteed against default (“accepted”) by one of a small number of prominent local mer-
chants, lowering the chances of a single default but concentrating credit risk in a small number of 
counterparties. A full-fledged financial panic developed in 1763 after the failure of a prominent 
acceptance house; the AWB could do little in response (Schnabel and Shin 2004). 
 
6. Epilogue and conclusion 
The innovations of 1683—the move to a de facto fiat standard—made it possible for the 
Bank of Amsterdam to conduct credit and monetary policy on terms comparable to modern cen-
tral banks. Our analysis shows that this change allowed the bank to lend with little if any capital, 
and to counter money outflows through sales of its metal stock. The weakness of this system lay 
in its dynamics: having no natural endowment of precious metal, Amsterdam’s liquidity required 
access to external supply of silver. Following the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 
1780, silver inflows were curtailed and the bank’s loans to the East India Company sharply ex-
panded, even as chances of their repayment diminished. Erosion of confidence led to a sharp 
depreciation of the bank guilder, and by 1795 the world’s first great experiment with fiat money 
largely had come to an end (van Dillen 1934, 112-115). 
Does the Amsterdam experience offer any insights for monetary policy today? Our answer 
is yes, precisely for the reason that, as first movers, the masterminds of the 1683 reform could 
construct a fiat money scheme unburdened by any modern ideas about central banking. The re-
sulting system, conceived in this “state of nature,” emphasized straightforward policies adapted 
from earlier experience under a commodity standard. In monetary terms, the bank acted to in- 
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crease the market value of its liabilities, i.e., the agio, in terms of externally valued collateral. In 
credit terms, the bank lent in restrained amounts, though on generous terms, to a blue-chip (and 
government-sponsored) borrower. Profits from these activities were quietly returned to the 
bank’s sponsor, the City of Amsterdam. 
Simplicity was the hallmark of the bank’s operations. There was little need for policy 
statements, elaborate targeting schemes, or exit strategies. Paradoxically, secrecy also played a 
role: while the general intent of the bank’s operations was public information, its financial condi-
tion was not. Many contemporary observers, Adam Smith included, believed the AWB to pos-
sess a stock of metal far in excess of its actual holdings, and the bank’s true condition was re-
vealed only after its final collapse. Until that point, the managers of the world’s first big fiat 
money factory seem to have absorbed a lesson familiar to today’s high-tech mavens: for a virtual 
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Appendix A: AWB Accounting 
I.  The Balance Sheet 
The AWB fiscal year ended in January, so the bank’s balance sheet sums categories on 
January 31. In bank guilders, the AWB reported its assets as metal held and loans due, its liabili-
ties were account balances, and the residual was capital. See Table 1 in the text for an example. 
Van Dillen (1925: 701-807) reproduces these from AWB records, and we have consolidated 
them for our sample period in Table A1. 
Because the balance sheet is a double entry system, changes in year-to-year balances have 
an offsetting change in another category. Bank operations that alter the balance sheet can be or-
ganized within a matrix intersecting balances, metal, loans and capital. Figure A1 shows the pos-
sibilities and assigns different AWB operations to the appropriate categories. Traditional deposits 
and withdrawals are only the start.  
 
Figure A1.  Cross-Category AWB Operations  
  Metal Loans Capital 
Balances  Deposits 
Withdrawals 
Bullion purchases and sales 
“Account” Lending: 
All VOC, Some Amsterdam 
VOC Interest 
Some Expenses 










Loans  “Metal” Lending: 





Loans were granted by creating account balances (VOC) or by releasing metal (Holland). 
Amsterdam used both techniques. Principal repayment reversed the process. 
 
Capital Accumulation 
Capital grew through the bank’s retained earnings. Interest payments by account eliminated 
bank guilders while interest payments by metal increased the bank’s metal stock. If the bank  
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considered interest due on January 31, then the AWB added the interest due to the loan’s princi-
pal and to the bank’s capital at that time. Other revenue from fees on withdrawals, account over-
drafts, receipts and money changing were collected in coin, so the metal stock increased from 
those operations.   
 
Capital Extraction 
Removing capital was the prerogative of the City of Amsterdam. When the city decided to 
extract retained earnings, it did so by “borrowing” from the AWB at no interest instead of reduc-
ing capital. It appears the city did this to avoid explicitly putting the AWB into a negative capi-
tal. This situation seems to have evolved. In the early 1650s, the city borrowed around 2 million 
guilders from the AWB to help build a new city hall (and home for the bank) on the Dam. Soon, 
the city stopped paying interest, for why pay your own bank? Beginning in 1685, when retained 
earnings had built sufficient capital, the city had the AWB write off both capital and some of the 
bank’s outstanding loans to the city until the AWB’s book capital was again near zero, but not 
negative. 
We agree with Willemsen (2009) that the city’s taking of metal and creating of balances 
should be treated as capital extraction rather than as loans. To see the consequences of this inter-
pretation, we calculate adjusted values for capital, loans, and assets. Adjusted capital subtracts 
the money from capital when the operation occurred instead of when the AWB later wrote-off 
the loan. Adjusted loans do not add the city as a borrower and do not subsequently write down 
those loans. Adjusted assets use the adjusted loans series: metal stock plus adjusted loans. Ad-
justment also ignores VOC interest due, but that is a minor issue. 
To create a monthly series, known changes in balances, loans, capital and metal have been 
applied to year start values. This information came from Van Dillen (1925: 701-807), extant bal-
ance books (Amsterdam Municipal Archive 5077/1311 through 1323), and our reconstruction of the 
flow of balances described in Section II below.  
We do not know the intra-year dispersion of non-interest profit, so we distributed the an-
nual change per month by withdrawal weight. The logic being that withdrawal fees were the 
largest non-interest source of revenue. For years we lack complete withdrawal information, the 
annual non-interest profit was evenly distributed per month. Discrepancies in balances and metal  
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are ignored within a year, and all levels are updated to reported levels (van Dillen 1925) at year 
start. We did not calculate book capital by month, so that series is only reported at year start.  
Figure A2 compares book and adjusted capital-to-asset ratios.  Figure A3 compares book 
and adjusted loans-to-asset ratios.  
 
Figure A2. AWB Monthly Capital-to-Asset Ratios, 1666 to 1703 
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Figure A3. AWB Monthly Loan-to-Asset Ratios, 1666 to 1703 
 
Source: Derived by authors from van Dillen (1925, 701-807). 
 
The AWB balance sheet, however, does not communicate two important categories of informa-
tion: gross flows and intra-category activity. The next sections report our efforts to reconstruct 
gross flows between bank accounts and the other balance sheet categories (see Figure A1).  
 
II.  The Specie Kamer 
To account for the creation and destruction of bank guilders, the AWB used a master ac-
count called the Specie Kamer (or Kammer or Camer) that translates as specie room. Specie 
Kamer transactions are the top row of Figure A1: deposits and withdrawals (account-metal), 
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pense payments (account-capital). The bulk of this paper’s evidential contribution has involved 
using the Specie Kamer to reconstruct these transactions. This section details how we did this 
and what we found. 
The Bank of Amsterdam organized its books by half-year increments: February through 
July, August through January. By the 1700s, the bank needed 3,000 pages to record each half-
year of bank activity. The amount of information in the ledgers is staggering. Fortunately for our 
purposes, the Specie Kamer master accounts are only a few pages per ledger.  
 
Receivers 
The bank used two sets of accounts to represent itself. When customers brought a deposit 
to the bank, the bank usually debited an account in the name of the employee who received the 
metal. Most years, the bank had two or three such receivers, and this system began in the 1620s. 
When metal left, the Bank of Amsterdam credited the Specie Kamer. As a result, the combina-
tion of receiver debits and the specie room credits gives the changes in the amount of bank 
money. Figure A4 offers a schematic of the flow of metal and bank money through the bank. 
Table A3 lists the 74 ledgers and 812 folios used in this study. All ledgers are stored at the Am-
sterdam Municipal Archives, and the archive retains dissemination rights over the images. The 
folios were digitally photographed and then encoded. 
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Figure A4. Standard Metal Flow through the Bank of Amsterdam 
 
 
Here is an example of how the deposit process worked. On 23 May 1687, Arthur Woodward 
received metal worth 480 bank guilders from Samuel Cohen (5077/109, f.1407). Cohen’s ac-
count was credited and Woodward’s account was debited. The ledger does not report what 
Cohen deposited, but it was likely a sack (a standard unit for bulk coins) of 200 silver Dukaat 
coins at 2.4 guilders each. If so, then Cohen also should have received a receipt granting the op-
tion to buy 200 Dukaten from the AWB for 480 bank guilders. We say should because the ac-
count ledgers never mention receipts. Two weeks later, on June 6, Woodward transferred 46,800 
guilders in metal to the Specie Kamer: Woodward’s account was credited (5077/109, f. 1445) 
and the Specie Kamer debited (5077/109, f. 1431).  
 
Non-Metallic Guilder Creation 
Some guilder creation, however, did not involve incoming metal, and the AWB recorded 
these directly in the Specie Kamer account and bypassing the receivers. For example, when the 
VOC borrowed money from the AWB, the VOC’s account was credited and the Specie Kamer 
was debited. To create our borrowing and repayment series, we separate account loans from de-
posits and repayments from withdrawals. 
For some years, extant AWB records tell exact loan creation, repayment and interest pay-
ments (AMA 5077/1311 through 1323), so we found the matching transactions. For other years, 
Bank of Amsterdam 
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van Dillen (1925, 979-84) provides total VOC borrowing, repayment and interest, so the match-
ing transactions can be readily found, for the transactions were labeled VOC, and borrowing 
occurred in 100,000 guilder increments, with the rare exception of a 50,000 increment. Repay-
ments are similarly named and carry the correct amounts for interest. 
For the remaining years (1671 through 1675 and 1683 through 1684), the challenge is ac-
counting for loans when we have only year start and year end debt levels. For these years, we 
have looked for 1) large, round VOC debits and 2) offsetting VOC credits that include the cor-
rect interest that 3) combine to leave the correct debt outstanding. Table A4 reports the loans we 
have identified. The interest rate was a consistent 4 percent except for anticipations in the mid-
1670s (de Korte 1984, 66), and the internal rates of return reflect that rate. Finally, we note that 
the ledger for August 1684 to January 1685 is missing and detailed summaries are missing, so 
we know nothing about that period except that 400,000 guilders in principal was retired. 
Occasionally, the City of Amsterdam also created accounts without depositing metal. As 
with the VOC, the AWB credited the City of Amsterdam by debiting the Specie Kamer. These 
transactions are detailed in the bank’s balance book records (AMA 5077/1311 through 1323), so 
we can separate them from metal transactions. Table A5 lists the municipal transactions that 
changed the supply of guilder (account transactions). Table A5 also lists when the city moved 
metal in or out of the bank but did not change the guilder money supply (metal transactions). 
Combining these two transaction types gives the full accounting of the city’s extraction of capital 
from the bank. 
 
Bullion 
After removing 1) loans and 2) transfers from receivers, the debit side of the Specie Kamer 
still contains some direct deposits that avoid the receivers. We lack a contemporaneous descrip-
tion of why some deposits were processed through receivers while others were not, but we think 
that bullion was directly deposited into the Specie Kamer while coins went through the receivers. 
To begin, the use of receiver accounting begins in the 1620s, so the distinction predates receipts 
or the agio. Next, the direct deposits are far more likely to involve a remainder less than a guil-
der, and even less than a stuiver (1/20th of a guilder). In contrast, receivers see far more large 
round deposits. Table A6 measures this dramatic difference through the percent of deposit trans-
actions by depository channel that fall into large round values or into odd values. Bullion tends  
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towards odd values because it is valued by weight and fineness, so a piece of bullion would 
rarely hit exactly a round guilder value. In contrast, official coins carried assigned values de-
nominated in stuivers: 0.05 guilder increments and almost all in 0.1 increments (Menno S. Polak, 
Historiografie en Economie van de “Muntchaos,” De Muntproductie van de Republiek 1606-
1795, Deel I (1998), NEHA, Amsterdam, pp. 67-101). The standard bulk unit for coins was a 
sack of 200, so round guilder values are common. Multiple sacks produce large values round to 
100 guilders or even 1,000 guilders. 
In practice, the difference looks like this. On July 20, 1688, Samuel Cohen made two de-
posits that were both credited to the same account (5077/113 f. 1491). With the receiver Arthur 
Woodward, Cohen deposited 2,400 guilders that could easily have been 4 sacks of silver rijders 
(a standard trade coin) at the ordinance value of 3 guilders per coin (5077/113 f. 1517). Through 
the Specie Kamer, Cohen deposited 6,873.25 guilders (5077/113 f. 1484). That sum is difficult to 
reach using standard coins if for no other reason than almost all Dutch coins were priced in even 
stuivers (0.1 increments). More importantly, we think the bullion-coin divide explains why 
Cohen made two deposits on the same day, for the pattern can be found on other days. For ex-
ample, six days earlier, Cohen had deposited 11,073.075 guilders in the Specie Kamer and 3,675 
guilders through a receiver (5077/131, ff. 1484, 1517). 
Our interpretation has other support. In April and May 1668, the Specie Kamer debits 
surged, and our theory suggests that this is a period of open market purchases. The AWB’s mint 
orders survive for that year, and simultaneous with the purchases, the bank sent large quantities 
of silver bullion (480,003 guilders worth) to the various mints from 27 April to 30 May 
(5077/1313). Table A7 reports the guilder value sent to each mint. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, the AWB did not separate metal outflows into different ac-
counts, so we use odd values as a proxy for bullion. While not perfect, a sort by odd-value versus 
round-value seems to reasonably mirror long-term behavior on the deposit side as seen in figure 
5.  Also, we know that the great run of June 1672 was not an open market operation. In that 
month, round values withdrawals (our proxy for coin) totaled 2.5 million guilders while odd-
values withdrawals (our proxy for bullion) totaled 0.3 million guilders. The monthly flow of 




III.  Fee Ratios 
Having reconstructed withdrawals for our sample period, we calculated an average fee per 
year by dividing fee revenue by total withdrawals. Table A9 reports the numbers in ratio of fee 
revenue over metal outflows.  
Fee revenue had to be constructed for the years 1666 to 1684, for the AWB reported total 
revenue. We adjusted revenue for the AWB’s practice of counting interest due from the VOC as 
revenue and subsequently not counting the actual interest payments. Next we removed interest 
payments from the VOC (by Specie Kamer account) and from the Province of Holland (by 
metal) to get a remainder to proxy “withdrawal fee” revenue. The proxy overstates actual with-
drawal fee revenue, for it also includes other minor fees like overdraft charges. We do not report 
revenue for the fiscal year 1673 because the bank replaced its regular revenue and expenses with 
a single 67,247 write down caused by the re-pricing of Russian coins held by the bank (van Dil-
len 1925: 746). 1677, 1682 and 1684 lack complete withdrawal information because of missing 
ledgers. The 1679 withdrawal numbers are low (fee ratio high) because we lack one Specie 
Kamer folio for that year. 
1683 is the only year during the receipt regime for which we have revenue and withdraw-
als. The ratio is 0.67 percent, but it is a poor proxy for withdrawal fees. Under the new regime, 
one paid a receipt fee to rollover the option, so no metal need leave the bank. Also the bank be-
gan charging a transfer fee of 0.025 percent (van Dillen 1934: 84). We cannot separate these 
different revenue sources, so we can only state that fee revenue dropped to a low rate in the year 
receipts were adopted. 
 
IV.  VOC 
Table A10 considers the AWB as a creditor to the VOC in two ways: levels and flows.  
Column 1 reports the amount the VOC owed to the AWB in bank guilders.  We calculate this 
amount using the bank’s records. The VOC records do not identify creditors. Column 2 reports 
the level of the VOC’s total debt in current guilders. The total debt is comprised of obligations of 
the company in general, obligations of each chamber, anticipations, bills of exchange, and mis-




While some years find the VOC owing 10 to 20 percent of its debt to the AWB, 15 out of 
36 fiscal years closed with the company owing nothing to the bank.  Levels suggest that in the 
VOC relied on the AWB as a substantial multi-year lender in and near the 1680s. Otherwise, the 
AWB was a long-term lender of little consequence. 
To see the short-term credit story, we have reconstructed the amount the VOC borrowed 
from the AWB during each fiscal year (column 4).  We do not report repayment, for we already 
know that often this debt was repaid within the year.  Instead, we wonder how the VOC was us-
ing the AWB to facilitate operations during a fiscal year.  Unfortunately, the VOC records do not 
tell us intra-year borrowing, so we cannot calculate the AWB’s share of all short-term lending to 
the VOC. 
We do know, however, some general measures of VOC activity, so we instead see what 
correlates with VOC borrowing from the AWB.  Our approach is descriptive and seeks only the 
gentlest of inferences regarding why the VOC borrowed from the AWB.  As a dependent vari-
able, we have the amount of VOC borrowing from the AWB per fiscal year in bank guilders. For 
explanatory variables, we know the following in current guilders: 
Two activities potentially creating demand for loans: 
1.  The total amount spent by the VOC in the Netherlands outfitting ships, paying in-
terest, etc. 
2.  The amount of cash dividends paid out by the company to shareholders. 
One activity potentially reducing the demand for loans 
3.  The total amount collected by the VOC from selling goods. 
And a few VOC balance sheet items (levels) at the start of each fiscal year that might af-
fect demand for AWB loans in the forthcoming year:  
4.  The trade good inventory 
5.  The cash and bank balances 
6.  Trade credits due to the VOC 
7.  The total external debt 
 
We regressed AWB lending on these seven variables using OLS with no modifications, and 
the result is in the paper as table 4.  Expenditures strongly and positively correlate with borrow-
ing.  They suggest a derived demand for AWB loans of 25 percent of total expenditures.  In con- 
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trast, Information about that year’s sales revenue lacks any explanatory power.  These results 
agree with the idea that the VOC was borrowing to outfit ships before the year’s fleet returned 
from Asia. 
Dividends appear of occasional consequence, and we cannot sort out why some dividends 
correlate with AWB borrowing while others do not. 
Of the four start-of-year levels, the three assets (substitutes to AWB loans) do have nega-
tive coefficients. While not statistically significant, the inventory and credit due levels suggest 
notable effects. Starting cash appears of little import. Finally, the level of VOC debt at the start 
of a fiscal year gives little information regarding AWB loans. 
In total, we feel that comparing AWB loan amounts to yearly VOC expenditures (Column 
5) gets at the heart of the AWB-VOC credit relationship.  While that share (Column 6) did vary, 
AWB loans became a routine, and often substantial, part of financing yearly ship outfitting. 
 
V.  Interpolation of the agio 
The agio series was interpolated using a time series on the London price of a bill of ex-
change payable in Amsterdam (McCusker 1978, Table 2.8), quoted as bank schillings (i.e., 0.3 
guilders) per pound sterling. The bill price series contains 179 monthly observations over the 
sample period, including 77 months for which there is no corresponding agio observation. A 
Kalman filter routine was used to fit a 3-month, bivariate VAR by maximum likelihood to all 
available observations on the agio and on the bill price. Interpolated values of the agio are the 
values returned by the Kalman smoother at the ML estimates. 
The accuracy of this method was tested by simulations, in which a random selection of agio 
observations (excluding the 1672 and 1693 outlier periods) were removed from the sample and 
then estimated using the interpolation procedure described above. The standard error of the 
smoothed estimates of the agio ranges from about 22 basis points over the holdout sample (with 
a 5 percent probability of observations being allocated to holdout sample) to 35 basis points 
(with a 50 percent probability). These are smaller than sample standard deviation of the agio 
series (about 50 basis points; see Table 3), suggesting that the interpolation procedure is of value 
in estimating missing values of the agio.  
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1666  10,057,240  7,454,756 300,000  1,925  2,072,898 224,662  0  8,411,238  1,646,002 
1667  9,808,032  6,904,522 600,000  5,950  2,072,898 224,662  0  8,137,198  1,670,834 
1668 7,916,122  4,700,428  900,000  8,311
4 2,072,898  224,662  9,823 6,202,978 1,713,144 
1669  7,851,084 4,488,911 1,000,000  18,333 2,072,898  224,662  46,281 6,078,661 1,772,423 
1670  7,166,504  4,841,334 0 0  2,072,898  224,662  27,610  5,367,018  1,799,486 
1671  11,160,451  8,862,891 0 0  2,072,898  224,662 0  9,355,574  1,804,877 
1672  9,056,487  6,654,277 100,000  0  2,072,898 224,662  4,649  7,210,433  1,846,054 
1673  6,852,616  3,664,117 0 0  2,072,898  224,662  890,940  4,933,701  1,918,915 
1674  8,366,142  5,976,295 0 0  2,072,898  226,830  90,119  6,514,474  1,851,668 
1675  8,451,723  5,944,943 200,000  0  2,072,898 226,830  7,052  6,587,691  1,864,032 
1676 7,071,631
5  4,471,902 300,000  0  2,072,898 226,830  0  5,174,297  1,897,334 
1677  7,862,941  4,747,706 800,000  15,507  2,072,898 226,830  0  5,924,194  1,938,747 
1678  7,226,068 3,475,326 1,400,000  51,013 2,072,898  226,830  0 5,229,008 1,997,060 
1679  7,545,572 3,632,511 1,600,000  13,333 2,072,898  226,830  0 5,488,900 2,056,672 
1680  10,069,553 6,156,491 1,600,000  13,333 2,072,898  226,830  0 7,950,340 2,119,213 
1681  10,444,657 7,136,595 1,000,000  8,333 2,072,898  226,830  0 8,277,109 2,167,548 
1682  8,741,257  5,536,528 900,000  5,000  2,072,898 226,830  0  6,510,142  2,231,115 
1683  10,567,596  7,595,133 400,000  3,333  2,342,299 226,830  0  8,295,978  2,271,618 
1684  9,990,534  6,822,321 400,000  5,199  2,536,184 226,830  0  7,695,285  2,295,249 
1685  9,300,020  6,096,968 0 0  2,976,222  226,830 0  6,959,229  2,340,791 
1686  9,860,991 7,472,301 1,100,000  6,124 1,055,735  226,830  0 9,813,776  47,215 
1687  10,237,827 7,913,428 1,300,000  29,604  767,965  226,830  0  10,175,964  61,863 
1688  10,884,061  9,946,553 0 0  710,243  227,264 0  10,752,029  132,032 
1689  12,864,189  11,831,444 0 0  805,481  227,264 0  12,714,692  149,497 
1690  12,775,203  11,742,458 0 0  805,481  227,264 0  12,604,282  170,921 
1691  13,569,830  12,708,006 0 0  634,560  227,264 0  13,557,117  12,713 
1692  13,183,611  12,321,787 0 0  634,560  227,264 0  13,181,990  1,620 
1693  13,559,192  12,602,130 0 0  729,798  227,264 0  13,524,659  34,533 
1694  11,535,761  10,377,152 0 0  931,345  227,264 0  11,479,354  56,407 
1695  12,108,018  10,405,194 400,000  0  1,075,560 227,264  0  12,013,638  94,380 
1696  10,332,717  8,648,941 0 0  1,456,512  227,264 0  10,207,122  125,595 
1697  10,412,947  9,110,123 0 0  1,075,560  227,264 0  10,263,048  149,899 
1698  15,386,685  12,383,861  1,500,000 0  1,275,560  227,264 0  15,233,928  152,757 
1699  16,919,060  13,716,236 600,000  0  2,375,560 227,264  0  16,750,540 168,520 
1700  16,468,096  13,365,272 500,000  0  2,375,560 227,264  0  16,284,849 183,247 
1701  15,040,586  12,037,762 800,000  0  1,975,560 227,264  0  14,830,152 210,434 
1702  15,044,384  11,541,561  1,300,000 0  1,975,560  227,264 0  14,782,959  261,425 




Source is authors’ adjustment of van Dillen (1925, 741-762) 
 
Notes for Table A1: 
 
1.  Holland’s debt is in current guilders. 
2.  The 1666 total comprises a loan of 132,000 at 4 percent, one year’s interest on that sum 
(5,280), a loan of 84,836 at 4 percent, and 9 month’s interest on that sum (2,546). See 
AMA 5077/1311, folio 4. In 1674, Holland’s debt was increased by 2,168 because of 
missed interest payments in 1673 (AMA 5077/1315, folio 4). An additional 434 in inter-
est is considered due from Holland starting in 1688 (5077/1322, folio 16). 
3.  Miscellaneous includes negative balances of assayers, mint masters, an emergency loan 
in 1672, and other unspecified claims. All miscellaneous lending ends in 1676. 
4.  Miscellaneous includes negative balances of assayers, mint masters, an emergency loan 
in 1672, and other unspecified claims. All miscellaneous lending ends in 1676. 
5.  The 1676 metal stock and capital have been reduced by 30,000 each per a write-down not 
booked until 1677 (van Dillen 1925: 747-8; AMA 5077/1315, folios 1-2). 
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Table A3. AWB Ledgers and Folios 
By Half-Year Periods: a=February to July, b=August to January         
Date  Ledger  Folios: Specie Kamer in Bold, Receiver Folios in Regular (kept in sequence by receiver) 
               
1666a  5077/62  147 1174  1391 149  151       
               
1666b  5077/63  1054 1233 1050 1052 1260       
              
1667a 5077/64  982 1149  1249  1387 984 986 988     
                 
1667b 5077/65  982 1088  1144  1263 984 986 988     
               
1668a 5077/66 1006 1082 1179 1238 1252 1276 1397 1528 1008 1010 
   1012           
                 
1668b 5077/67 1010 1154 1474 1012 1018 1020      
                
1669a 5077/68 1010 1203 1479 1012 1014 1016      
               
1669b 5077/69 1010 1314 1012 1014 1330 1016 1353     
               
1670a 5077/70 1008 1177 1220 1010 1328 1012 1129 1240 1014 1347 
             
1670b 5077/71 1008 1060 1114 1262 1010 1250 1420 1012 1348 1014 
   1172 1416          
              
1671a 5077/72  90 1273  1375  1450  1494  1034 1077 1140 1036 1120 
   1038 1207          
              
1671b 5077/73 1028 1142 1501 1030 1032 1034      
              
1672a 5077/74  990  1415 1433 1439 1449 1455 1461 1465 1478 1488 
   1496 1501 1076 1078 1080       
             
1672b 5077/75 1044 1047 1046 1220 1048 1050      
              
1673a  M i s s i n g             
              
1673b 5077/76 1020 1082 1158 1022 1024 1026 1032 1062  258  298 
   722 1062  1116         
              
1674a 5077/77  878 1209  1303 880 882 884      
              
1674b 5077/78  910 1114  1341  1446 912 914 916     
              
1675a 5077/79  952 1282  1467 954 956 958      
              
1675b 5077/80  974 1217 976  978  980       
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1676a 5077/81 1016  1018  1020  1022        
              
1676b 5077/82 1042  1044  1046  1048        
              
1 6 7 7 a   M i s s i n g             
              
1677b 5077/83 1044 1494 1046  1048  1050       
               
1678a 5077/84 1078 1452 1080  1082  1084       
              
1678b 5077/85 1058  1060  1062  1064        
              
1679a 5077/86 1021  1022  1023  1024        
              
1679b 5077/87 1008 1332 1421 1009  1010  1011      
              
1680a 5077/88  978 1024  1382 979  980  981      
              
1680b 5077/89 1006  979  980  981        
              
1681a 5077/90  982  979  980  981        
              
1681b 5077/91  982  979  980  981        
              
1682a 5077/92  981  979  1390  980  1396  949      
              
1682b  Missing            
               
1683a 5077/94  990 1406  1564 988 1505 989 1052  1296  1351  1514 
              
1683b 5077/96  990 1292  1337  1422  1519 988 994 989  1286  1463 
              
1684a 5077/98  990  1277 1317 1360 1383 1411 1484 1585  988 1518 
    1567  989  1407  1512  1573       
              
1684b  Missing             
               
1685a 5077/101  990  1274 1300 1344 1402 1450 1500 1533  988 1330 
    1453  989  1334  1427  1484       
               
1685b 5077/103  990  1299 1335 1344 1349 1365 1378 1399 1462 988 
    1296 1317 1459 1503 1532  989  1300 1321 1411 1470 
    1508  1531          
              
1686a 5077/105  990  1280 1300 1334 1390 1451 1491  988 1275  1462 
    1492  989  1313  1408  1471  1494      
              
1686b 5077/107  990  1283 1319 1378 1437 1476  988 1303  1339  1366 
    1392  989  1284 1310 1335 1358 1369 1402 1470 1492 
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1687a 5077/109  990 1297  1354  1431  1496 988 1291  1322  1353  1376 
    1413 1465 1491  989  1283 1303 1329 1380 1407 1445 
    1477  1497            
              
1687b 5077/111  990  1312 1377 1462 1482 1498 1515 1527  988 1290 
    1315 1347 1383 1412  989  1289 1301 1321 1345 1371 
    1395  1413            
              
1688a 5077/113  990  1299 1326 1380 1429 1484 1537  988 1378  1450 
    1511  989  1379 1432 1464 1489 1517 1534     
              
1688b 5077/115  990  1314 1351 1403 1455 1487 1514 1540  988 1354 
    1393 1420  989  1306 1338 1366 1388 1405 1416 1443 
    1495             
              
1689a 5077/117 1171 1423 1450 1461 1493 1552 1596 1181 1176 1427 
    1503  1564  1624         
              
1689b 5077/119 1171 1429 1476 1533 1581 1616 1640 1676 1181 1176 
   1421  1439  1471  1519  1532          
              
1690a 5077/121 1171 1419 1440 1463 1502 1542 1591 1624 1664 1181 
    1176  1643          
              
1690b 5077/123 1171 1421 1439 1463 1499 1540 1575 1609 1651 1695 
    1176 1454 1527 1562 1581 1181 1259 1555 1586   
              
1691a 5077/124 1171 1427 1440 1464 1485 1511 1549 1573 1622 1675 
   1715  1176  1632  1692  1181  1603      
              
1691b 5077/126 1171 1448 1478 1521 1574 1620 1668 1709 1739 1176 
    1466 1547 1676 1181 1487 1563 1657       
              
1692a 5077/128 1171 1461 1490 1512 1547 1583 1623 1667 1698 1728 
    1176  1581  1181  1492  1632  1719      
              
1692b 5077/130 1171 1467 1498 1545 1586 1631 1675 1734 1766 1176 
    1488 1635 1683 1758 1181 1569 1622 1674 1785   
              
1693a 5077/132 1171 1486 1504 1532 1559 1585 1619 1639 1654 1673 
   1675 1705 1728 1772 1793 1176 1616 1750 1181 1609 
    1756            
              
1693b 5077/134 1171 1444 1465 1501 1527 1576 1640 1686 1176 1554 
   1655  1181  1562  1637            
              
1694a 5077/136 1171 1443 1464 1505 1540 1585 1628 1687 1732 1776 
    1176  1689  1181  1705        
              
1694b 5077/138 1171 1447 1481 1530 1601 1653 1721 1176 1181 1182  
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1695a 5077/140 1171 1451 1475 1517 1564 1610 1679 1760 1799 1176 
    1181           
              
1695b 5077/142 1171 1454 1487 1535 1599 1673 1747 1797 1176 1562 
    1612  1181            
              
1696a 5077/143 1171 1465 1501 1548 1607 1662 1720 1765 1813 1176 
    1515  1598  1745  1181  1533  1695      
              
1696b 5077/145 1171 1478 1512 1581 1645 1730 1829 1176 1720 1833 
    1181  1588  1699         
                
                
              
1697a 5077/146 1171 1481 1536 1589 1645 1704 1764 1176 1482 1590 
    1674 1725 1784 1181 1469 1573 1650 1744     
                
1697b  Missing            
              
1698a 5077/148 1171 1405 1523 1593 1688 1768 1176 1664 1784 1181 
    1594  1735          
                
1698b 5077/150 1171 1476 1556 1676 1815 1176 1505 1560 1619 1666 
    1761 1860 1181 1487 1577 1693 1770 1902     
                
1699a 5077/152 1171 1504 1533 1596 1663 1744 1802 1842 1176 1516 
    1595 1674 1785 1849 1181 1541 1645 1812     
                
1699b 5077/154 1171 1484 1537 1595 1689 1807 1176 1513 1588 1624 
    1655 1730 1843 1181 1478 1502 1576 1704 1741 1824 
                
                
              
1700a 5077/156 1271 1612 1657 1707 1779 1885 1961 1276 1601 1646 
    1684 1726 1871 1914 1281 1590 1637 1739 1917 1962 
                
1700b  Missing             
              
1701a 5077/158 1271 1659 1734 1829 1939 2002 1276 1597 1700 1743 
    1799 1895 1967 2020 1281 1607 1622 1643 1665 1719 
   1810  1872  1946  2003            
              
1701b 5077/160 1271 1629 1670 1737 1805 1878 2011 1276 1601 1609 
    1624 1712 1801 1932 1281 1639 1733 1859 1960   
              
1702a 5077/162 1271 1627 1691 1779 1848 1935 1276 1647 1704 1825 
    1928 1281 1630 1685 1765 1847 1983       
                













 of Return 
7-Jul-71 200,000  → 10-Sep-71 201,446.20  4.06% 
         
17-Jul-71 400,000  → 9-Sep-71  402,410.38  4.07% 
         
24-Jul-71 300,000  → 11-Sep-71 301,643.75  4.08% 
         
4-Aug-71 200,000  → 610576  200,861.50  4.03% 
         
9-Jan-72  100,000       
8-Feb-72 100,000  → 9-Mar-72  200,800.00  3.24% 
         
13-Nov-74 100,000  → 4-Dec-74  200,942.45  4.10% 
13-Nov-74 300,000  → 2-Apr-75  203,777.70  5.79%
1 
         
10-Jan-75 300,000  → 11-Jan-75 300,000.00  
         
9-Jul-75  150,000       
13-Aug-75 200,000       
28-Aug-75 200,000       
7-Sep-75 100,000  → 19-Oct-75 654,710.90  3.97% 
         
18-Sep-75 100,000       
3-Oct-75  100,000       
4-Oct-75  100,000       
9-Oct-75 100,000  → 24-Oct-75 401,022.30  4.06% 
         
31-Jan-83 403,333
2  → 4/2/83  101,533.33  4.19% 
     4/2/83  203,066.65  4.19% 
     4/2/83  101,533.33  4.19% 
         
4/16/83 200,000  → 11/25/83  204,644.45  3.80% 
         
5/13/83 100,000  → 11/25/83  102,088.80  3.89%  
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6/18/83 100,000  → 11/25/83  101,744.35  3.98% 
         
7/14/83 50,000  → 11/25/83  50,727.73  3.96% 
         
7/20/83 50,000  → 11/25/83  50,677.78  3.87% 
         
8/23/83 50,000  → 11/25/83  50,511.10  3.97% 
         
8/31/83 100,000  → 11/25/83  100,944.48  4.01% 
         
10/26/83 100,000  → 12/3/83  100,400.00  3.84% 
         
11/1/83  100,000       
11/9/83  50,000       
11/12/83  100,000       
11/15/83 100,000  → 12/1/83  350,816.65  3.92% 
         
9/13/83  100,000       
10/5/83  100,000       
10/12/83  100,000       
10/14/83 100,000  → 1/31/84
3 405,199.00  3.97% 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
Notes 
1.  De Korte (1984: 66) suggests that the VOC offered 6 percent on anticipations in 1674.  
2.  Uses the bank’s record of debt due at the start of fiscal year 1683. 
3.  Used the bank’s record of debt due at the end of fiscal year 1684. 
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Table A5. Municipal Capital Extractions and Injections 
 
 
Municipal Capital Extractions  
       
Date  Type  Bank Guilders  Current Guilder  Agio Used 
5/30/82 Account  20,000.00  20,850.00  4    1/4 
14-Jan-83 Metal  249,400.50 260,000.00  4    1/4 
10-Feb-83 Metal  143,885.00 150,000.00  4    1/4
1 
26-Jan-84 Metal  50,000.00  52,125.00  4    1/4
1 
1-Mar-84 Metal  50,000.00  52,062.50  4    1/8
1 
2-May-84 Metal  96,154.00 100,000.00  4
1   
26-Oct-84 Metal  150,000.00 156,187.50  4    1/8
1 
11-Jan-85 Metal  143,885.00 150,000.00  4    1/4
1 
14-Feb-85 Metal  120,863.30 126,000.00  4    1/4 
13-Jul-85 Metal  47,961.65  50,000.00  4    1/4 
28-Jul-85 Metal  47,961.65  50,000.00  4    1/4 
28-Aug-85 Metal  95,923.30 100,000.00  4    1/4 
15-Nov-85 Metal  47,961.65  50,000.00  4    1/4 
7-Dec-85 Metal  59,632.60  62,167.00  4    1/4 
19-Feb-87 Metal  57,142.85  60,000.00  5     
7-Apr-88 Metal  95,238.10 100,000.00  5     
23-Jan-93 Metal  95,238.10 100,000.00  5     
4-Jun-93 Metal  142,500.00 150,000.00  5    5/19
2 
30-Oct-93 Metal  59,047.60  62,000.00  5     
25-Feb-94 Metal  48,976.00  51,458.00  5     
20-Jul-94 Metal  95,238.00 100,000.00  5     
17-Feb-95 Metal  95,238.00 100,000.00  5     
8-Nov-95 Metal  95,238.00 100,000.00  5     
11-Jan-96 Metal  190,476.00 200,000.00  5     
18-Dec-97 Account  100,000.00     
14-Jan-98 Account  100,000.00     
28-Oct-98 Account  100,000.00     
6-Nov-98 Account  200,000.00     
8-Dec-98 Account  200,000.00     
25-Nov-98 Account  300,000.00     
23-Dec-98 Account  300,000.00     
3-Mar-99 Account  100,000.00     
18-Mar-99 Account  100,000.00     
18-Mar-02 Metal  95,522.40 100,000.00  4  11/16 
       
74 
 
Table A5 Continued     
       
Municipal Capital Injections    
Date Type  Bank  Guilder  Current  Guilder  Agio 
12-Jun-86 Metal  191,847.00 200,000.00  4    1/4 
19-Jul-86 Metal  95,923.00 100,000.00  4    1/4 
23-Mar-87 Metal  57,142.85  60,000.00  5     
26-Aug-87 Metal  28,571.45  30,000.00  5     
4-Sep-87 Metal  28,571.45  30,000.00  5     
18-Apr-96 Metal  190,476.00 200,000.00  5     
1-Sep-96 Metal  190,476.00 200,000.00  5     
28-Mar-99 Account  200,000.00     
6-Mar-99 Metal  100,000.00 105,000.00  5     
8-Apr-00 Account  400,000.00     
 




1.  Imputed from bank guilders (5077/1321 f 7) and current guilders (5077/1322 loose insert). 
2.  Coins removed in sacks worth 600 current booked at 570 bank: likely driegulden. 
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Table A6.  Large Value and Odd Value Deposits 1666 to 1703 
 
 Specie  Kamer  Receiver 
 Direct  Debits
1 Debits 
Total Deposit Transactions  3,686  17,771 
    
Share of Deposits with guilder values that are 
Large Values: Round 100's  6.1%  48.5% 
    
Share of Deposits with guilder values that are 
Odd Values:     
With a Partial Guilder  81.6%  7.4% 
 
With Partial Stuiver  
(1/20
th of a guilder)  10.3%  0.5% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Notes 
1.  Excludes loan transactions, receiver transfers, and expenditures. 
 
 
Table A7. AWB Mint Operations, April and May 1668 
 
Guilder Value of Silver Bullion Sent to Various Mint 
 
Mint 27-Apr  1-May  8-May  14-May  30-May 
Gelderland 22,471.70    28,986.25    27,030.40 
Holland 30,284.85    30,105.00    27,837.75 
West-Friesland 23,091.80    29,123.60     
Utrecht   25,394.55    27,890.45  26,278.85 
Friesland         27,419.17 
Overijssel   23,877.80      
Deventer  26,306.85      
Kampen   24,396.55       
Zwolle City  24,116.85    27,586.30    27,804.95 
       
Total 99,965.20  99,975.75  115,801.15 27,890.45  136,371.12 
       
Grand Total  480,003.67         
 
Source: AMA 5077/1313 
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Table A8. Monthly Flows: 1666 to 1703 in Bank Guilders 
 
  Guilder Creation by Metal Inflows  Guilder Destruction by Metal Outflows 










Feb-66 42,281.95  0.00 12,060.00 17,726.88 
Mar-66 17,631.75  0.00 421,942.00  15,030.28 
Apr-66 55,413.20  346,000.00 227,226.00 105,405.70 
May-66 92,164.03  127,501.60 49,448.00  125,898.75 
Jun-66 66,628.95 30,000.00  833.00  7,413.03 
Jul-66 134,581.98 100,000.00 199,040.00  66,083.47 
Aug-66 269,442.73  1,223.75 45,690.00 19,349.83 
Sep-66 181,391.53  0.00 85,368.00 15,278.05 
Oct-66 6,063.40  0.00 93,501.00 13,460.00 
Nov-66 11,344.80  0.00 19,497.00 12,904.00 
Dec-66 1,723.10  0.00  97,174.00  105,545.35 
Jan-67 0.00 0.00  84,506.00  209,289.35 
Feb-67 5,666.95  12,000.00 2,516.00  31,667.90 
Mar-67 3,911.75  19,223.10 21,928.00  119,202.98 
Apr-67 43,451.53  9,863.75 108,923.00 156,628.80 
May-67 20,656.10 17,898.10 146,668.00  57,984.18 
Jun-67 9,303.00  13,238.55 22,705.00 44,185.53 
Jul-67 9,870.30  30,300.38 32,217.00 72,909.75 
Aug-67 1,000.00  12,000.00 79,980.00 27,386.80 
Sep-67 12,679.50 42,073.90 189,302.00 107,987.45 
Oct-67 2,060.50  0.00 275,652.00  74,613.98 
Nov-67 14,537.35 12,000.00 183,364.00 340,681.90 
Dec-67 1,074.50  12,000.00 366,740.00  13,159.95 
Jan-68 5,775.70  0.00 47,486.00 36,121.00 
Feb-68 35,867.35  0.00 188,989.00  76,232.75 
Mar-68 8,260.00 6,000.00 303,322.00  77,171.25 
Apr-68 10,744.00  330,701.80 299,259.00 139,993.30 
May-68 7,128.40  1,437,506.25 300,638.00 147,324.68 
Jun-68 5,548.90  82,176.18 68,993.00 90,181.73 
Jul-68 19,091.50 61,236.20 93,215.00 99,446.75 
Aug-68 23,396.00 34,166.17 22,006.00 30,366.63 
Sep-68 12,941.50  5,810.63 13,241.00 38,153.17 
Oct-68 7,259.80  44,632.75 56,306.00 45,533.77 
Nov-68 13,627.60 44,419.25 183,430.00  31,601.70 
Dec-68 14,407.15  0.00 52,315.00 12,496.25 
Jan-69 11,376.50  2,391.80 42,000.00 18,943.45 
Feb-69 39,286.20  0.00 2,030.00  14,882.90  
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Mar-69 28,162.10  6,000.00 3,772.00  19,579.40 
Apr-69 5,600.00 6,000.00 17,290.00 76,818.15 
May-69 14,670.00 18,000.00 8,829.00  23,639.25 
Jun-69 305.50  20,610.70  14,123.00  8,238.33 
Jul-69 39,348.20 15,564.70 27,376.00 21,568.05 
Aug-69 67,135.30 18,000.00 5,887.00 9,013.05 
Sep-69 53,504.00 73,726.60 5,889.00 7,547.40 
Oct-69 36,889.35  0.00 65,291.00 15,060.60 
Nov-69 100,741.45  2,387.50 27,079.00  137,058.65 
Dec-69 294,380.30  3,888.15 50,335.00 23,614.15 
Jan-70 17,923.85 76,000.00 24,009.00  1,659.00 
Feb-70 108,314.75  25,748.05 840.00  5,013.75 
Mar-70 79,802.30 45,520.48 5,179.00  12,531.00 
Apr-70 279,390.38 101,164.38 40,689.00 17,844.63 
May-70 200,993.00 483,741.45 125,735.00  10,910.50 
Jun-70 125,639.55 148,622.20 11,004.00 16,772.88 
Jul-70  121,593.10  0.00 4,432.00 7,919.05 
Aug-70 139,628.25 815,231.20 8,283.00 3,355.50 
Sep-70 137,260.03  1,415,986.48 257,001.00 573,082.22 
Oct-70 91,050.75  229,519.45 75,786.00 26,545.10 
Nov-70 74,448.15  131,008.00 91,176.00 21,786.48 
Dec-70 121,171.35 139,721.88 148,987.00  30,581.00 
Jan-71 243,924.75 128,101.30 52,038.00  7,705.35 
Feb-71 277,492.55  59,626.55 2,505.00 7,560.00 
Mar-71 293,073.40  2,981.40 18,665.00  844.50 
Apr-71 114,742.98  0.00 129,335.00  62,673.20 
May-71  274.00  842.70 90,409.00 70,272.75 
Jun-71 28,717.65  5,000.00 428,959.00 183,927.55 
Jul-71 0.00 0.00  644,761.00  54,174.80 
Aug-71 6,006.30  751.25  301,470.00 9,447.50 
Sep-71 32,144.80  1,194.25 436,628.00 211,452.98 
Oct-71 0.00 0.00  521,353.00  8,430.00 
Nov-71 2,100.00  11,378.60 165,363.00  52,643.20 
Dec-71 3,005.00  31,694.72 22,267.00 10,776.00 
Jan-72 6,608.35  94,975.90 7,526.00 3,357.75 
Feb-72 28,985.90  0.00 31,200.00  7,587.00 
Mar-72 8,840.00  362.40 2,752.00  43,275.45 
Apr-72 17,807.80  1,977.42 4,243.00 7,554.00 
May-72 61,561.40  492,991.48 840.00  16,087.50 
Jun-72 88,319.22  2,205.00 2,478,372.00  291,351.73 
Jul-72 184,624.65 124,543.08 497,630.00  28,198.90 
Aug-72 36,767.85  900.00 44,475.00  1,160.65 
Sep-72 60,398.10 32,908.30 68,234.00 20,114.50  
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Oct-72 15,109.70  141,521.70 3,807.00  10,978.90 
Nov-72 33,357.90  0.00 17,870.00  6,684.00 
Dec-72  19,019.50 2,422.05 3,844.00 5,995.50 
Jan-73 931.40  81,112.15 13,683.00 11,762.25 
Feb-73        
Mar-73        
Apr-73        
May-73        
Jun-73        
Jul-73        
Aug-73 19,496.50 46,196.25  0.00  7,985.15 
Sep-73 161,096.95 222,601.32 1,695.00  0.00 
Oct-73  198,788.75  272,967.28 0.00 0.00 
Nov-73  95,726.95  129,162.38 0.00 0.00 
Dec-73 17,608.30  132,844.53 2,460.00 6,897.50 
Jan-74 3,007.00  148,456.25 6,771.00  16,868.25 
Feb-74 37,689.65  6,380.60 2,231.00 5,937.00 
Mar-74 825.30  33,477.60 3,432.00 5,955.00 
Apr-74 3,468.70  10,773.95 29,706.00  7,582.38 
May-74 1,747.30  31,773.50 175,013.00  31,501.25 
Jun-74 1,887.90  84,048.65 138,407.00  25,434.00 
Jul-74 0.00  207,612.90  172,931.00  41,257.75 
Aug-74 317.30  129,572.48  145,276.00  16,933.65 
Sep-74 771.00  31,718.85 15,516.00 34,929.90 
Oct-74 10,405.40 18,945.45 61,159.00 42,939.90 
Nov-74 1,679.10  69,453.35 76,100.00  9,014.25 
Dec-74 6,074.00  17,025.95 110,571.00  10,293.02 
Jan-75 0.00  362,830.25 1,698.00  25,602.00 
Feb-75 4,338.97  118,484.35 33,487.00  1,707.00 
Mar-75 3,019.90  0.00 31,296.00  5,150.68 
Apr-75 6,141.00  0.00  75,102.00  170,103.80 
May-75 2,495.80  0.00  113,865.00  50,837.07 
Jun-75 6,560.60 2,562.50 138,637.00  15,207.50 
Jul-75 11,515.90  0.00  161,774.00  0.00 
Aug-75 21,882.47  843.75  105,108.00 17,551.13 
Sep-75 916.65  0.00  9,366.00  40,367.90 
Oct-75 1,250.65  0.00 13,450.00 12,515.82 
Nov-75  0.00  0.00 177,964.00 308,633.05 
Dec-75 0.00 0.00  15,948.00  132,890.10 
Jan-76 8,709.50  24,333.00 25,803.00 39,794.70 
Feb-76 13,307.90  0.00 8,319.00  13,891.25 
Mar-76 8,828.30  0.00 22,619.00 54,737.50 
Apr-76 500.00  0.00  0.00  241,665.50  
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May-76 8,822.15  0.00 9,200.00  20,477.50 
Jun-76  5,700.00  41,425.00 0.00 0.00 
Jul-76 16,915.55  273,883.57  0.00 27,346.90 
Aug-76 1,581.80  346,481.10 3,090.00 1,694.00 
Sep-76  400.00  25,493.60 0.00 0.00 
Oct-76  3,604.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nov-76 346.30  4,214.75  50,650.00 878.75 
Dec-76  363.60 2,831.80 1,745.00 6,455.95 
Jan-77 370.30  25,687.50 10,616.00  9,439.45 
Feb-77        
Mar-77        
Apr-77        
May-77        
Jun-77        
Jul-77        
Aug-77 7,111.65  15,978.30 85,820.00 98,266.40 
Sep-77 450.60  0.00  130,784.00  69,522.85 
Oct-77 307.90  0.00  27,103.00  132,552.20 
Nov-77  58,044.50  0.00 436,334.00 409,548.10 
Dec-77 14,375.70  0.00 78,314.00  1,747.20 
Jan-78 16,434.10  0.00 73,820.00 66,953.15 
Feb-78 23,952.00  0.00 7,500.00 5,240.15 
Mar-78 800.00  4,460.00 9,000.00 4,280.70 
Apr-78 600.00  10,022.60  0.00  4,267.90 
May-78 2,283.30  18,674.65 6,000.00 2,556.85 
Jun-78 1,211.00  177,557.65  0.00 3,352.85 
Jul-78 6,140.25  189,009.85  854.00 1,725.40 
Aug-78  9,015.25  30,399.75 0.00 0.00 
Sep-78 0.00  18,022.60 27,224.00  5,701.10 
Oct-78 0.00  44,495.95 0.00  2,400.20 
Nov-78  844.70  10,475.00 189,570.00 123,344.75 
Dec-78 0.00 0.00 0.00  8,653.05 
Jan-79 644.40  35,159.45 10,800.00  5,119.20 
Feb-79  6,569.05  3,086.00 0.00 9.23 
Mar-79 2,417.00  0.00 2,606.00 4,324.20 
Apr-79  477.33 71,640.10 19,078.00 12,148.80 
May-79  1,248.40  11,683.20 0.00 0.00 
Jun-79 0.00  5,950.10  22,263.00  857.50 
Jul-79 812.00  0.00  0.00  5,171.10 
Aug-79  34,193.30  22,672.60 0.00 0.00 
Sep-79  410.00  8,893.22 0.00 0.00 
Oct-79 12,791.68  0.00  0.00  2,937.27 
Nov-79 19,560.25  170,200.80  0.00  206.25  
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Dec-79 3,718.40  994,726.08  22,200.00  0.00 
Jan-80 3,774.95  398,093.43  850.00  0.00 
Feb-80 9,068.75  807,539.45 0.00  2,602.95 
Mar-80 1,614.90  351,608.68 0.00  1,749.20 
Apr-80 523.00  91,019.88  0.00  1,890.05 
May-80 0.00  23,384.40  16,098.00 0.00 
Jun-80 450.00  36,513.50 881.00 884.80 
Jul-80 879.15  11,485.30 847.00 850.75 
Aug-80 1,000.00 1,105.00  0.00 2,603.00 
Sep-80 410.00  9,012.50 869.00  1,716.70 
Oct-80 310.50  6,065.60 847.00  0.00 
Nov-80 0.00  5,295.60  24,612.00  153,029.20 
Dec-80 0.00 0.00  100,000.00  64,326.35 
Jan-81 0.00 0.00  600.00 0.00 
Feb-81 800.00  0.00  0.00  2,634.10 
Mar-81 606.80  0.00  0.00  5,215.10 
Apr-81  600.00  9,977.87 631,315.00 128,315.70 
May-81 2,200.00  22,518.85 24,000.00 29,296.75 
Jun-81 636.50  0.00  0.00  89,417.30 
Jul-81 3,897.50  0.00  0.00  30,613.40 
Aug-81  624.00  0.00 97,125.00 60,810.30 
Sep-81 0.00 0.00  109,590.00  59,799.40 
Oct-81 1,200.00  11,834.90 0.00  6,712.85 
Nov-81 16,786.40  0.00  2,500.00  501,789.50 
Dec-81 8,865.20  0.00 4,075.00  55,193.45 
Jan-82 18,000.00  173,820.97 1,845.00 2,649.20 
Feb-82 7,482.95  85,315.42 878.00  4,470.15 
Mar-82 5,160.90  0.00 4,700.00  56,944.05 
Apr-82 500.00  0.00  209,253.00  26,773.07 
May-82  460,656.23  0.00 95,763.00 78,272.02 
Jun-82 659,556.27  42,480.80  0.00  6,225.40 
Jul-82  212,945.23  0.00 3,428.00 2,660.45 
Aug-82        
Sep-82        
Oct-82        
Nov-82        
Dec-82        
Jan-83        
Feb-83 184,182.38  0.00 1,670.00 6,924.25 
Mar-83 357,589.70  1,847.40 36,605.00  4,954.35 
Apr-83 154,233.10  0.00 317,860.00  12,986.15 
May-83 74,066.40  0.00 69,052.00 11,704.85 
Jun-83 91,458.70  0.00 34,333.00  5,618.40  
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Jul-83 92,490.00  1,704.45 79,414.00 11,119.73 
Aug-83  188,894.50  0.00 64,566.00 10,050.55 
Sep-83 167,101.78  0.00 123,477.00  9,767.60 
Oct-83 4,530.00 1,963.03 345,429.00 101,454.70 
Nov-83 122,451.93  0.00 214,866.00  81,728.70 
Dec-83 37,709.50  5,993.95 161,552.00  55,987.65 
Jan-84 10,485.00  0.00 275,112.00  32,708.85 
Feb-84 13,683.00  0.00 73,097.00  7,153.65 
Mar-84 17,589.00 22,115.40 161,097.00  23,129.30 
Apr-84 9,784.93  361,688.92 114,982.00 204,887.35 
May-84 132,032.70 243,664.63 92,181.00  143,689.98 
Jun-84 188,574.00  20,656.35 87,063.00 61,044.70 
Jul-84 302,832.00  61,072.75 83,044.00 68,196.88 
Aug-84        
Sep-84        
Oct-84        
Nov-84        
Dec-84        
Jan-85        
Feb-85 59,613.20  0.00 177,525.00  23,789.30 
Mar-85 90,448.13  0.00 335,682.00  98,249.03 
Apr-85 194,290.50  461.30 235,364.00 131,520.00 
May-85 135,725.00  868.65 305,484.00  44,659.85 
Jun-85 177,386.00  0.00 171,196.00  40,915.00 
Jul-85 87,948.00  3,322.80 107,650.00  30,471.15 
Aug-85 71,098.20  198.10 50,425.00 26,277.05 
Sep-85 685,587.40  0.00 6,705.00  15,981.60 
Oct-85 173,985.00  1,909,653.70 348,795.00 159,926.65 
Nov-85 255,815.05 121,388.35 253,706.00  74,069.80 
Dec-85 405,705.50  1,667.00 176,448.00  99,035.90 
Jan-86 433,556.65  615.35 67,996.00 20,322.80 
Feb-86 197,181.55  736.55 238,669.00  29,934.45 
Mar-86 46,080.00  0.00 331,510.00  36,147.43 
Apr-86  146,397.00  0.00 77,953.00 34,860.15 
May-86 49,549.60  485.50 381,787.00  42,081.25 
Jun-86  217,282.80  0.00 55,361.00 31,877.95 
Jul-86  274,323.80  164.85 31,433.00 60,160.60 
Aug-86  149,666.60  254.10 64,948.00 28,885.25 
Sep-86 253,821.90  1,355.95 41,825.00 30,535.50 
Oct-86 678,557.90  5,005.50 195,766.00  35,305.20 
Nov-86 393,131.00  959.70 224,175.00  84,708.95 
Dec-86 119,610.45  18,799.40 362,834.00 612,842.00 
Jan-87 590,355.55 167,380.98 28,721.00 29,758.35  
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Feb-87 342,139.00  3,699.00 33,650.00 33,103.50 
Mar-87 421,221.85  5,469.10 1,750.00  38,143.80 
Apr-87 464,544.20  21,793.10 3,627.00  42,363.20 
May-87 326,724.00  3,694.90 26,803.00 34,675.40 
Jun-87 375,232.50  45,386.58 11,283.00 32,011.98 
Jul-87 248,930.35  871.20  7,872.00  30,469.48 
Aug-87 315,502.50 104,129.25 9,762.00  32,765.25 
Sep-87 513,033.00 196,871.55 17,805.00 27,504.10 
Oct-87 888,687.70  51,826.15 247,620.00  75,146.45 
Nov-87 194,124.60  2,338.00 556,685.00  36,169.25 
Dec-87 15,783.00  114,714.03 959,013.00  57,639.93 
Jan-88 1,125.00  23,868.02 345,366.00  58,116.10 
Feb-88 4,950.00  84,316.90 58,608.00 39,685.00 
Mar-88 51,508.50 54,698.22 34,030.00 59,278.55 
Apr-88 214,215.10 164,898.08 3,614.00  47,514.00 
May-88 251,861.50  41,396.27 125,116.00  51,934.75 
Jun-88 444,427.85 109,463.20 3,630.00  42,275.55 
Jul-88 478,896.20 100,710.63 30,030.00 37,151.75 
Aug-88 285,388.65  3,419.95 48,291.00 51,037.20 
Sep-88 289,154.50 114,435.07 78,015.00 32,292.85 
Oct-88 846,116.55  35,591.55 36,362.00 38,199.15 
Nov-88 487,246.80 143,593.58 539,663.00  38,718.90 
Dec-88 133,548.00 264,442.55 740,048.00  33,777.02 
Jan-89 13,173.00 42,915.50 485,865.00  29,264.40 
Feb-89 122,770.50  49,079.23 39,593.00 36,919.00 
Mar-89 169,889.40  49,327.67 143,946.00  56,456.40 
Apr-89 16,086.00 24,812.35 598,185.00 135,268.12 
May-89 75,954.00  119,297.22 14,085.00 34,649.35 
Jun-89 147,739.20 108,929.80 81,399.00 61,867.97 
Jul-89 190,473.50  22,660.05 4,486.00  64,139.25 
Aug-89 297,603.60  63,848.57 10,608.00 47,095.10 
Sep-89 221,104.50  81,086.97 1,206.00  34,513.60 
Oct-89 180,741.30 105,669.60 2,650.00  39,152.00 
Nov-89 187,760.60 166,762.30 371,373.00 207,432.35 
Dec-89 20,400.00 95,522.40 398,868.00  39,476.30 
Jan-90 0.00  19,615.45 160,795.00  50,338.92 
Feb-90 0.00  78,751.20 66,809.00 54,667.95 
Mar-90 0.00  25,945.40 1,650.00  72,894.15 
Apr-90 4,740.00  97,700.15 8,495.00  64,903.55 
May-90 43,716.00  247,207.68 3,563.00  77,838.10 
Jun-90 261,723.00  3,311.60 9,319.00  76,428.95 
Jul-90 116,354.30  637.88  890.00  44,439.20 
Aug-90 267,780.00  25,868.25 6,299.00  89,145.30  
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Sep-90 138,244.70 189,287.20 1,812.00  65,507.00 
Oct-90 332,921.10 160,733.87 18,208.00 78,588.60 
Nov-90 559,305.15 236,744.33 41,058.00 61,481.35 
Dec-90 93,817.50  349.40  927,224.00 65,420.55 
Jan-91 5,616.00  52,688.00 88,902.00 49,506.38 
Feb-91 7,494.00 1,585.85 273,832.00 109,971.53 
Mar-91 47,700.00  2,397.95 96,739.00  135,059.03 
Apr-91 13,270.50  1,614.45 255,776.00 164,138.85 
May-91 95,480.00  2,517.80 128,288.00 450,312.75 
Jun-91 453,760.00 348,902.88 2,747.00  55,687.50 
Jul-91 94,815.00 98,993.85 63,330.00 55,924.47 
Aug-91 634,382.20 306,059.88 38,982.00 71,940.85 
Sep-91 204,453.00  1,636.45 9,211.00  61,379.47 
Oct-91 177,498.60  2,091.30 6,893.00  60,090.80 
Nov-91 190,813.80  2,077.75 489,169.00 185,428.65 
Dec-91 133,944.50  617.35 384,140.00  44,415.00 
Jan-92 120,310.40  827.70 93,425.00 69,134.80 
Feb-92 128,121.00  489.05 73,169.00 46,457.10 
Mar-92 128,306.50  750.05 271,149.00  89,860.68 
Apr-92 273,315.00 240,584.25 139,418.00 164,992.70 
May-92 313,365.00 238,189.73 131,074.00 178,449.40 
Jun-92 161,854.00  844.82 438,318.00  97,404.35 
Jul-92 148,197.70  0.00 234,942.00 166,335.60 
Aug-92 143,322.00 145,356.60 145,979.00  67,395.80 
Sep-92 191,897.00  900.05 90,915.00 71,355.15 
Oct-92 278,040.90  232.20 19,674.00 68,656.35 
Nov-92 680,177.63  11,863.05 48,455.00 71,187.90 
Dec-92 270,530.15  380.40 168,328.00 230,200.75 
Jan-93 273,875.30  1,618.40 204,517.00  71,746.92 
Feb-93 189,815.65  1,645.60 274,921.00 115,916.35 
Mar-93 71,071.50  1,036.00 300,014.00  92,286.90 
Apr-93 73,757.85  848.50  377,685.00 72,471.75 
May-93 285,020.40 374,528.10 858,679.00 173,674.33 
Jun-93 188,712.77  3,447.85 422,798.00 100,566.10 
Jul-93 84,470.60  1,806.65 224,124.00  62,751.00 
Aug-93 220,997.20  10,110.15 129,343.00  53,373.00 
Sep-93 40,623.00  1,331.00 86,628.00 54,585.65 
Oct-93 96,540.00  1,752.25 133,843.00  61,629.75 
Nov-93 289,878.00  2,885.75 76,779.00 47,728.85 
Dec-93 257,745.00  66,204.13 497,125.00  73,100.85 
Jan-94 63,888.00 57,727.27 37,878.00 47,411.30 
Feb-94 106,005.00  1,945.85 224,802.00  64,672.95 
Mar-94 83,284.00  1,942.05 216,590.00  59,290.95  
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Apr-94 15,747.00  125,121.53 292,345.00  49,925.35 
May-94 55,410.00  1,022,275.45 228,580.00  56,609.60 
Jun-94 207,507.00 298,151.93 98,022.00 65,563.80 
Jul-94 43,857.00  182,252.77 50,948.00 58,163.90 
Aug-94 62,349.00  576,368.20 101,476.00  57,266.95 
Sep-94 10,125.00  2,813.90 226,467.00  47,678.05 
Oct-94 26,592.00 64,115.20 112,239.00  44,143.40 
Nov-94 25,737.00 20,463.10 309,909.00 300,312.27 
Dec-94 40,506.00  128,805.57 365,157.00  85,704.35 
Jan-95 35,118.00  179,740.70 6,621.00  31,202.80 
Feb-95 46,684.30  2,856.00 15,919.00 44,765.20 
Mar-95 27,636.00  2,108.25 123,943.00  65,230.60 
Apr-95 4,986.00  22,366.80 281,830.00  43,157.00 
May-95 22,184.30 24,468.50 204,971.00  49,828.00 
Jun-95 49,196.50  137,404.30 79,836.00  253,656.63 
Jul-95 0.00  2,749.98  84,212.00  291,572.30 
Aug-95 3,600.00 3,921.00 53,507.00 44,850.70 
Sep-95 59,589.00 11,351.55 61,854.00 36,098.30 
Oct-95 205,669.50  5,652.00 13,261.00  244,618.50 
Nov-95 130,863.80  28,858.40 224,037.00  46,820.13 
Dec-95 55,140.00 85,730.80 58,571.00 42,127.75 
Jan-96 88,128.20 32,675.23 19,889.00 58,477.55 
Feb-96 179,979.10  6,673.15 115,244.00  76,721.75 
Mar-96 149,403.00  8,008.20 17,372.00 57,250.90 
Apr-96 137,732.30  36,303.23 70,171.00 56,238.75 
May-96 138,771.00 304,043.18 123,066.00  66,894.90 
Jun-96 133,998.00  96,978.43 181,541.00  62,116.70 
Jul-96 34,402.00 72,280.38 22,573.00 56,540.10 
Aug-96 100,982.00 101,314.52 15,132.00 57,564.85 
Sep-96 25,954.50 34,728.65 248,374.00  38,865.85 
Oct-96 80,223.60 38,853.70 47,562.00  235,678.85 
Nov-96 97,574.70 10,353.35 99,833.00 86,673.35 
Dec-96 155,232.55  45,018.80 290,850.00  30,647.15 
Jan-97 123,383.20 161,004.30 7,788.00  69,762.35 
Feb-97 199,219.70  90,696.00 7,148.00  41,515.45 
Mar-97 216,923.00  46,972.95 63,253.00 49,048.90 
Apr-97 251,432.00  44,003.20 697,509.00  47,140.00 
May-97 502,977.85  30,159.32 155,454.00  93,267.90 
Jun-97 547,987.40  30,686.30 13,417.00 57,735.30 
Jul-97 452,420.00  21,096.45 3,751.00  38,411.25 
Aug-97        
Sep-97        
Oct-97         
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Nov-97        
Dec-97        
Jan-98        
Feb-98 51,042.00  1,835.25 12,892.00 23,016.12 
Mar-98 216,798.00  15,189.48 142,377.00  29,509.90 
Apr-98 6,888.00  33,180.12 233,110.00 237,245.33 
May-98 402,185.30  42,003.20 207,678.00  37,903.92 
Jun-98 179,351.90  8,420.30 13,471.00 57,640.02 
Jul-98 154,964.40  3,751.15 22,442.00 67,041.35 
Aug-98 255,661.00  78,688.35 373,486.00  47,891.60 
Sep-98 329,362.90  528.45 365,242.00  49,625.30 
Oct-98 409,924.90 706,765.30 3,220.00  40,335.27 
Nov-98 300,261.20 899,359.70 780,586.00  25,894.67 
Dec-98 199,486.90  71,153.55 426,599.00  34,842.73 
Jan-99 239,540.70  5,278.60 4,849.00  34,341.58 
Feb-99 202,214.50  0.00 226,775.00  50,755.60 
Mar-99 244,456.00 300,000.00 516,603.00 162,951.07 
Apr-99 135,708.00  1,049.40 38,544.00  126,532.97 
May-99 116,241.00  836.65 143,258.00  85,931.45 
Jun-99 305,985.40  0.00 258,471.00 114,059.22 
Jul-99 193,570.50  541.75 131,634.00 209,086.80 
Aug-99  281,760.00  0.00 12,393.00 95,752.83 
Sep-99 230,132.50  15,454.98 20,595.00 57,793.25 
Oct-99 202,075.00  669.20 87,109.00  117,560.53 
Nov-99 343,926.55  0.00 250,785.00  49,087.97 
Dec-99 338,751.00  0.00 473,692.00  38,129.68 
Jan-00 295,651.00  887.00 162,391.00  49,528.42 
Feb-00 414,494.00  0.00 92,656.00 49,365.63 
Mar-00 294,717.00  0.00 287,522.00 101,260.07 
Apr-00 202,891.60  1,418.90 888,665.00  46,190.45 
May-00 113,160.00  35,782.25 1,904.00  57,833.35 
Jun-00 158,005.00  78,574.32 13,019.00 51,952.15 
Jul-00 217,719.70  42,656.53 14,613.00 75,711.50 
Aug-00        
Sep-00        
Oct-00        
Nov-00        
Dec-00        
Jan-01        
Feb-01 1,000,918.00  76,062.00 10,842.00 15,740.85 
Mar-01 295,339.00  15,252.60 78,514.00  101,112.77 
Apr-01 438,613.65  33,020.80 898,806.00  79,438.60 
May-01 476,311.20  12,616.00 31,606.00 55,779.05  
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Jun-01  240,974.00  439.00 23,500.00 59,903.60 
Jul-01 297,155.00  585.70  50,850.00 181,757.35 
Aug-01 674,192.50  0.00 546,573.00 215,119.93 
Sep-01 151,970.00  511.50 315,060.00  74,588.87 
Oct-01 107,983.50  0.00 485,866.00 146,374.82 
Nov-01 127,254.00  572.40 553,705.00  99,400.80 
Dec-01 172,701.00  0.00 457,281.00 134,440.05 
Jan-02 97,540.00  1,856.88 75,246.00 55,962.98 
Feb-02 186,039.50  12,400.00 146,978.00  73,961.33 
Mar-02 273,878.95  2,669.50 48,937.00 54,078.15 
Apr-02 153,588.45  3,594.70 80,264.00  184,334.42 
May-02  141,577.20  0.00 92,276.00 86,812.15 
Jun-02 101,424.00  0.00 100,298.00  61,564.60 
Jul-02 77,450.15  0.00  6,828.00 38,648.30 
Aug-02 95,793.00  0.00  192,896.00 42,243.35 
Sep-02 26,519.00  0.00 43,261.00 84,601.35 
Oct-02 153,122.00  18,441.85 204,600.00  39,448.90 
Nov-02 64,903.75 13,446.30 666,366.00  36,393.90 
Dec-02 52,639.00 11,822.32 461,310.00 134,852.70 
Jan-03 16,509.00 45,754.70 87,529.00 53,628.35 
 




Table A9. Calculation of Withdrawal Revenue 
 
          
Fiscal 
Year Revenue 
Change in  
VOC 












1666 39,934  -4,025 -11,750 -8673  15,487  2,049,670  0.76% 
1667 57,861  -2,361 -26,667 -8673  20,141  2,560,011  0.79% 
1668 74,949  -10,022 -35,933 -8673  20,340  2,431,159  0.84% 
1669 42,313  18,333 -46,283 -8673  5,690  610,589  0.93% 
1670  20,861  0 0  -8673  12,189 1,555,197  0.78% 
1671 56,491  0  -6,362 -8673  41,633  3,344,676  1.24% 
1672 88,594  0  -800 -8673  79,119  3,617,700  2.19% 
1673              
1674 28,794  0  -942 -8673  19,177  1,189,420  1.61% 
1675 49,354  0  -8,489 -8673  32,193  1,696,559  1.90% 
1676 57,506  -15,507 -32,678 -8673  647  482,826  0.13% 
1677  74,023 -35,506 -5,509  -8673  24,336     
1678 74,636  37,680 -99,455 -8673  4,186  417,590  1.00% 
1679 78,004  0 -64,000 -8673  5,332  92,651  5.75% 
1680 63,534  5,000 -56,111 -8673  3,750  374,407  1.00% 
1681 79,889  3,333 -41,789 -8673  32,760  1,842,897  1.78% 
1682 56,497  1,667 -31,745 -8260  18,159     
1683 42,598  -1,866 -18,689 -8260  13,782  2,068,942  0.67% 
1684 64,987  5,199  0 -8260  61,926     
 
Source: van Dillen 1925: 701-807, and authors’ calculation. 
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Table A10.  The VOC-AWB Credit Relationship 
 1  2  3    4  5  6 
 AWB  Loans 
 
VOC External Debt           
FY Ending 
in bank 
guilders  in current guilders 
AWB's 





4/30/1667 300,000  12,068,477  3%    300,000  7,767,160  4% 
4/30/1668 600,000  14,776,188  4%    800,000  10,358,418  8% 
4/30/1669 1,100,000  15,584,693  7%    1,600,000  9,962,440  17% 
4/30/1670 100,000  14,205,462  1%    500,000  7,408,009  7% 
4/15/1671 0  12,254,925  0%    0  8,042,724  0% 
4/15/1672 0  11,779,872  0%    1,300,000  8,440,686  16% 
4/15/1673 0  14,456,424  0%    0  5,970,759  0% 
4/15/1674 0  13,392,636  0%    0  4,863,855  0% 
4/15/1675 0  12,558,813  0%    700,000  8,688,494  8% 
4/15/1676 0  13,099,801  0%    1,850,000  8,960,247  22% 
4/15/1677 1,200,000  11,513,962  11%    700,000  9,553,385  8% 
4/15/1678 800,000  12,289,233  7%    1,600,000  8,277,794  20% 
4/15/1679 1,500,000  12,205,185  13%    100,000  5,953,366  2% 
5/31/1680 1,600,000  11,175,629  15%    0  8,238,865  0% 
5/31/1681 1,300,000  11,050,717  12%    0  8,030,878  0% 
5/31/1682 1,000,000  10,397,454  10%    500,000  8,738,099  6% 
5/31/1683 600,000  8,254,522  8%    1,500,000  7,711,769  20% 
5/31/1684 0  8,509,926  0%    1,200,000  7,902,883  16% 
5/31/1685 400,000  9,320,289  4%    1,200,000  9,342,818  13% 
5/31/1686 1,200,000  9,379,135  13%    2,600,000  9,213,639  29% 
5/31/1687 1,800,000  8,526,588  22%    2,100,000  9,101,201  24% 
5/31/1688 2,000,000  7,618,671  27%    1,000,000  9,762,741  11% 
5/31/1689 600,000  7,168,758  9%    1,200,000  9,084,777  14% 
5/31/1690 700,000  7,502,565 10%    1,000,000  8,679,884  12% 
5/31/1691 600,000  6,540,960 10%    200,000  8,737,656  2% 
5/31/1692 0  6,930,417  0%    1,400,000  8,056,246  18% 
5/31/1693 0  6,566,856  0%    400,000  11,020,009  4% 
5/31/1694 0  7,172,006  0%    1,800,000  10,718,641  18% 
5/31/1695 200,000  7,134,778  3%    1,950,000  10,275,190  20% 
5/31/1696 250,000  6,578,286  4%    1,150,000  11,217,275  11% 
5/31/1697 0  7,441,164  0%    1,900,000  11,153,469  18% 
5/31/1698 0  8,790,546  0%    3,000,000  8,863,991  35% 
5/31/1699 0  7,637,538  0%    1,200,000  15,054,157  8% 
5/31/1700 0  7,565,911  0%    1,300,000  11,332,523  12% 
5/31/1701 0  8,723,226  0%    3,600,000  13,783,169  27% 
5/31/1702 1,000,000  8,730,226  12%    3,300,000  12,399,812  28% 
 
Source: VOC data from de Korte (1984: 1A-1C).  
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 Appendix B. Theoretical illustrations 
This appendix offers a formal examination of the efficiency gains stemming from changes 
in the AWB’s credit policies following the 1683 reform. The model environment considered 
builds in a natural financial intermediary and payments provider role for the Bank of Amster-
dam, i.e., the bank is endowed with advantages in these capacities. The model then traces 
through the consequences of the bank’s transition to a fiat standard. 
Time is discrete and infinite in the model environment. Time is indexed by t, and each pe-
riod (which can be thought of as a “year” for convenience) is subdivided into 3 stages {0,1,2}, 
referred to as winter, spring/summer, and autumn. There are 2 classes of agents, domestic and 
foreign. Foreign agents have measure 1 and domestic agents have measure ½.
64 Agents are  ex 
ante identical within a class. Domestic agents coordinate their production and consumption deci-
sions and function as a single agent. In addition to private agents, there is an exchange bank 
whose activities are described below. Economic activity takes place in 2 locations, the domestic 
economy (“Amsterdam”) and elsewhere (“abroad”). 
Synopsis of the model 
The model incorporates a stylized cycle of trade. Foreign agents (natural lenders) earn silver 
abroad in the winter and bring it to Amsterdam in spring, in search of trading opportunities. Sil-
ver is exchanged with the coalition of domestic agents (a natural borrower) in return for bank 
money that can be used to purchase goods in Amsterdam. Domestic agents use the silver they 
obtain for consumption abroad, while engaged in productive activities (overseas expeditions) that 
do not return goods until the autumn of the same year. 
At the beginning of autumn, some foreign agents experience a liquidity (i.e., preference) 
shock, meaning they must depart Amsterdam in order to consume. Also in autumn, goods arrive 
in Amsterdam from summer productive activities undertaken by domestic agents. Foreign agents 
not experiencing a liquidity shock may either purchase these goods with bank money, or may 
choose to liquidate their bank balances for silver, which can then be used to purchase consump-
tion goods abroad. Table 1 summarizes the timing of actions in the model. 
                                                 
64 The labels “domestic” and “foreign” are more handy than accurate. “Long-term participants in the Amsterdam 





Table 1: Timing of actions in the model 
 




Winter (stage 0)  Young foreign agents trade production goods 
abroad for silver 
 
Spring (stage 1a)  Young arrive in Amsterdam; trade silver for 
bank money; old (liquidity constrained) trade 
money for silver and depart Amsterdam 




Old, liquidity-constrained agents purchase con-
sumption goods abroad 





Liquidity shock revealed for young agents  Goods arrive in Amster-
dam from summer pro-
duction 
  If liquidity shock  If no shock   
Autumn (stage 
2b) 
No action; wait to 
trade money for sil-
ver next period 
Use money to purchase 
goods from domestic 
agents & consume 
Sell goods to domestic 
agents for money 
 
Commodities and feasible trades 
There are 3 commodities: a nondurable general consumption good, a nondurable special con-
sumption good, and a durable good, silver, which is used for only for trade. Silver can be stored 
at negligible cost. 
All trading outside Amsterdam is of silver for the other goods, and always at the world price 
of φ units of silver per good, normalized to 1 φ =  for both goods. All trading within Amsterdam is 
of goods for money (bank balances, described below). For expositional clarity, domestic agents 
may not purchase silver by issuing IOUs to foreign agents.
65 Likewise, foreign agents may not 
directly purchase special goods from domestic agents with silver, but must use money to make 
their purchases. Finally, domestic agents must sell their special good production in their “home 
market,” Amsterdam. 
 
                                                 
65 This constraint could be partially relaxed without qualitatively changing the model results. What matters is that 
foreign agents are less willing to accept domestic agents’ debt than is the bank.  
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Preferences, endowments, and technologies 
Each generation of foreign agents lives for 2 years. A generation-t foreign agent is born 
abroad in stage 0 of the year t and can produce  0t x  units of the general good for sale on the world 
market. He (typically) journeys to Amsterdam in stage 1, although the agent always has the op-
tion of remaining abroad and trading exclusively in the world market. At the beginning of stage 
2, a foreign agent experiences a shock that determines his preferences for general good versus 
special good consumption. The utility of a generation-t foreign agent i is 
  02 1 , 1 2 2 () ( 1 ) ( )
ii i i i
tt tt t t Ux u c u f λβ λ + =− + + −  (4) 
where β is an annual discount factor,  1, 1
i
t c +  represents i’s consumption of the general good (which 
takes place in the summer of year  1 t+ ),  2
i
t f  represents his consumption of the special good 
(which typically takes place in the autumn of year t),
66  2
i
t λ  is a preference shock, and u is a con-
cave utility function. To allow for analytic results, we take 
(1 ) () / ( 1 ) uc c
ρ ρ
− = −  where  (0,1) ρ ∈ . 
The probability distribution for  2t λ  is 
  2
, 1 with probability ½






An agent who receives a preference shock  2 1 t λ =  is said to be “liquidity constrained,” in the 
sense that the agent only wants to consume the general good, which is only available abroad for 
silver. The remaining (called “unconstrained”) foreign agents want to consume the special good, 
either abroad or in Amsterdam, depending on market conditions. An agent’s type (constrained or 
not) is private information. 
Domestic agents are infinitely lived and have objective 





Vd a x β
∞
=
=− ∑  (6) 
where  1t d  is the agent’s summer (stage 1) consumption of the general good abroad,  1t x  is the 
summer production of the special good undertaken by the agent, and  (0, ) a β ∈ . There is no dis-
counting from spring to autumn. Productive effort  1t x  yields 21 tt yx =  special goods which are 
brought to Amsterdam. Domestic agents cannot earn silver abroad, so silver for their general 
                                                 
66 This is a slight abuse of notation: the special good may also be purchased on the world market and consumed in 
the spring of the next year, although this does not occur in the equilibria we consider.  
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good consumption must be obtained through trade in Amsterdam with foreign agents. Foreign 
agents have an incentive to trade with domestic agents in the Amsterdam market, since domestic 
agents can produce the special good at a cost below the world price of one.
67 
Silver can be held by domestic agents, foreign agents young or old, or the exchange bank 
(described below). Let  ( ) 11
yo
tt SS be the per-capita, non-negative amount of silver held by old for-
eign agents at the end of stage 1a money market trading, and let  ( ) 12
dd
tt SSbe domestic agents’ 
stage 1a (stage 2) per-capita silver holdings (again nonnegative). The amount of silver (per do-
mestic resident) held at the exchange bank after stage 1(2) trading is  ( ) 12
bb
tt SS. 
Efficient steady-state allocations 
As a benchmark, we first consider efficient steady-state allocations. The planner maximizes 







WV E U β
∞
=
=+ ∑  (7) 
over allocations () 011 1211121 ,,,,,,,,,
yoddb
ttt ttttt tt x xdcfSSSSS . Feasibility constraints are 
  0 2 ,1 1 ,1 1 ,1 1 , 1 , 1 1 22 2
db y y o d b
tt t t tt t t x S S S SSSS −− − +++ ≥+ + + , (8) 
  11
o
tt Sc ≥ , (9) 
  1, 1,
d
tt Sd ≥  (10) 
  12 tt x f ≥ . (11) 
Constraint (8) says that the total silver available to the Amsterdam economy in stage 1a consists 
of silver imported by young foreigners plus any silver stored by domestic agents, the bank, and 
old foreigners. Constraint (9) says that the general good consumption of foreigners is limited by 
the amount of silver they have available. A similar constraint (10) applies to consumption by 
domestic agents. Constraint (11) is the resource constraint on special good consumption by for-
eigners. The truth-telling condition for the planner’s problem is 
  21 , 1 () ( ) tt uf u c β + ≥ , (12) 
                                                 
67 I.e., the law of one price does not hold for special goods. Sufficient frictions operate in the background to allow 
this situation to persist.  
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i.e., an unconstrained foreign agent must do at least as well by consuming domestically as he 
could by reporting himself as a constrained agent, accepting a silver payment, and then using the 
silver to purchase the special good abroad the following year. Participation constraints for for-
eign and domestic agents are 
  ,0 EU V ≥ . (13) 
The set of planner’s allocations (superscript p) is described as 
 
,
11 1 ()1 ,  i . e . , 1
pp o p uc c S ′ = ==  (14) 
 
(1/ )
22 1 ( ) ,i.e.,
pp uf a f x a
ρ − ′ == =  (15) 
 
,
11 2 1 2 1 , , where ( ) ( )
pd p p p p p dS a f d d u cu f c ⎡⎤ =∈ = + − ⎣⎦  (16) 
  01 1 2




dp bp yp SSS = ==  (18) 
Conditions (14) and (15) are standard optimality conditions. Note that truth-telling condition (12) 
does not bind in the planner’s allocation. Condition (16) says that domestic agents’ consumption 
is indeterminate between the bounds imposed by individual rationality for both classes of agents. 
Condition (17) says that silver imports by young foreigners must be sufficient to cover general 
good consumption by domestic agents and old foreigners. Silver carries an opportunity cost and 
has no liquidity value over the winter, so the planner sets inter-period holdings of silver by do-
mestic agents, the bank, and foreigners equal to zero (condition (18)).  
The exchange bank 
Money takes the form of balances at an exchange bank. Initially we assume the bank does 
not engage in lending. More specifically, the exchange bank credits any deposits of silver into 
the exchange bank at a fixed number of units of silver θ  per florin of bank money, normalized to 
1 θ = . Withdrawals from the bank occur at a mandated price  1 θ < . 
In the decentralized economy, money can be traded for silver in stage 1a. The market value 
of money in terms of silver is θ units of silver per unit money (“florin”).
68 Absence of arbitrage 
                                                 
68 I.e., the price of bank money is proportional to one plus the agio. As explained above, the actual agio expressed 
the price of bank money relative to current money, whose metallic value could vary over time. While a model of 




requires that the market price of bank money be in the interval [, 1 ] θ . As long as the market price 
of money is in this interval, there is (weakly) no incentive for agents to deposit or withdraw sil-
ver from the bank: hence, for steady states (i.e., for constant θ ) we exclude the possibility of 
deposits or withdrawals. 
However, anyone with funds at the exchange bank has the option of withdrawing funds from 
the bank at any time. Suppose that at a given moment the bank has liabilities (accounts) of M 
florins per domestic resident and holds 
b S  units of silver (“coins”) in its vault. Strictly speaking, 
the depositors’ right of withdrawal means that the exchange bank faces a liquidity constraint on 




b SMθ ≥  .  (19) 
Taken at face value, this would require that the bank maintain a metal-to-deposit ratio of around 
98 percent. As we have seen above, in practice the AWB was generally able operate with a 
smaller ratio. Hence (19) is modified to 
  /
b SMδθ ≥  ,  (20) 
for some “comfort factor”  1 δ < . 
The special consumption good is traded in Amsterdam in stage 2 at money price  t p . Since 
unconstrained foreigners can choose where to consume the special good in stage 2, the silver-
equivalent price of special goods in Amsterdam  ( ) tt t p σθ ≡  (i.e., the terms of trade for domestic 
agents) can be no greater the silver price of goods abroad (one). 
 
Steady-state monetary equilibria 
In the decentralized economy, young foreign agents wishing to purchase goods in Amster-
dam must first use their silver earnings to purchase money holdings  1
y
t M . Foreign agents maxi-
mize the expectation of utility (4) over  0 x ,  1 c ,  2 f ,  1
y M , and  1
y S , taking prices as given, subject 
to budget constraints 
  01 1
yy
tt t t x MS θ = +  (21) 
                                                 
69 Following the Diamond-Dybvig tradition, constraint (19) could be motivated as necessary to prevent sunspot-
based runs on the exchange bank. Runs can occur since types are unobservable and unconstrained agents can always 
obtain the special good abroad.  
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  11 1 1 , 1
yy
ttt t M Sc θ + + +≥  (22) 
  2
y
tt t M pf ≥  (23) 
Steady-state optimality conditions for foreign agents reduce to 
  () 22 (½) ( ) ( ) ufu f βσσ σ ′′ + =  (24) 
In addition, it can be shown that a young foreign agent will always liquidate his silver earnings 
for money. If he is unconstrained, he will spend this money to purchase the special good; if he is 
constrained, he will trade it the following year to obtain silver to purchase the general good. 
Condition (24) implicitly defines a function  2 () gf σ =  where g can be shown to be strictly 
decreasing and strictly convex for coefficient of relative risk aversion  (0,1) ρ ∈ . The inverse 





1, for  1,
()






= ⎨ ≥ ⎩
 .  (25) 
The kink in the inverse demand curve occurs because the domestic silver-equivalent price for the 
special good cannot exceed the world price of unity. Domestic agents’ total revenue from special 
good sales can then be expressed as 
  22 2 () () TR f f f σ =  (26) 
which can be shown to be strictly increasing and concave (strictly for  2 1 f > ). 
A domestic agent in the decentralized economy maximizes his objective (6) subject to stage 
1a, stage 1b, and stage 2 budget constraints 
  2, 1 2, 1 1 1
dd d d
tt t t t t SM S M θθ −− +≥ +  (27) 
  112
dd
ttt SdS ≥+ (28) 
  11 2
dd
tt t t M px M +≥  (29) 
over  111 2 1 2 ,,,, ,
dd d d
ttt t t t dxSSMM where 
d
it M  denotes the agent’s money holdings at the end of stage i 
of period t. Production decisions  1t x  are made cooperatively, i.e., production is set so as to 




1, if (1) /
/, i f ( 1 ) /
TR a
x




′ < ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
′′ ≥ ⎪ ⎩
 (30)  
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where TR′ is the right derivative of TR. That is, the coalition of domestic agents sets marginal 
revenue TR′ from its sales of the special good equal to marginal cost (where the latter is adjusted 
for the time cost of money), if this cost is sufficiently low. Otherwise, domestic agents produce 
just enough of the special good to equate its silver-equivalent price in Amsterdam to the world 
price. 
A steady-state monetary equilibrium is an allocation, combined with a set of per-capita 
money holdings  1
y M ,  1
d M ,  2
d M , and prices p and  12 () θ θθ = = , for which (a) first-order condi-
tions (24) and (30) hold, and (b) markets clear. Money market clearing in particular requires 
  211
dy d M MM =+ , (31) 
i.e., that sales of money by domestic agents  21
dd M M −  plus sales by old foreigners  1
y M  equal 
purchases by young foreigners  1 2
y M . Equilibria are described as 
Proposition 1. There is a continuum of steady-state monetary equilibria where 
(1) Allocations, the silver-equivalent price of special goods  p σ θ = , and the real stock of 
bank money are the same in every equilibrium; 
(2) The price of money and the money price of special goods are indeterminate in the inter-








(3) The nominal money stock varies with θ the according to 
  1/ Md θ =  (32) 
 where  1 d  is the equilibrium consumption of the general good by domestic agents; 
(4) Money is held exclusively by foreigners over the summer, and by domestic agents and 
old foreigners over the winter 
  21 1 ;0 ;
dy d MMM M = ==  (33) 
(5) Neither domestic nor foreign agents store silver over the winter 
  211 0;
dyo SSS = == (34) 
(6) The exchange bank stores sufficient silver to satisfy its liquidity constraint (20) 
  ( ) 12 1 /.
bb SS M d δθ δ θ θ == =  (35)  
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Proof (Sketch). There are two cases to consider. 
Case 1:  (1) / TR a β ′ < . In this case the equilibrium allocation can be derived as follows: from 
(30), domestic agents produce just enough special goods to satisfy demand at the world silver-
equivalent price of one, so  1 σ = . From inverse demand (25) and market clearing, it follows that 
12 1 df == . Using budget constraints (21) and (23), it follows that  1 1 c = . 
The rest of the equilibrium is then constructed as follows. Absence of arbitrage in the money 






mestic agents, holding silver over the summer is clearly dominated by consumption, hence their 
summer money holdings are zero. All winter asset holdings by domestic agents then take the 
form of money as in (32), and in equilibrium this must equal money expenditure by the uncon-
strained foreign agents as in (33). 
Case 2:  (1) / TR a β ′ ≥ . In this case, from (30), domestic agents optimally produce 
[ ]
1
2*( / ) xT R a β
− ′ = , hence  22 2 ** f fx == from market clearing. Then from inverse demand (25), 
2 *( * ) 1 f σ σσ == < ; using budget constraints (21)-(23) and (27)-(29), and market clearing, it 
follows that 
*
111 2 2 2 *( * ) ( * ) cdd f f T R f σ == = = . The rest of the equilibrium is constructed as in 
the previous case. 
Corollary. Any steady-state monetary equilibrium in the decentralized economy is inefficient. 
Proof. In case 1, the equilibrium domestic agents’ general good consumption  1 d  and foreign 
agents’ general good consumption  1 c  is in the set of planner’s allocations described by (14)-(18). 
However, monopoly pricing by domestic agents causes the foreign agents’ consumption of the 
special good  2 f  to fall below its efficient value. 
In case 2, foreign agents again underconsume the special good relative to the planner’s allo-
cation due to monopoly pricing. Since foreign agents’ general good consumption (=domestic 
agents’ consumption = TR) is greater than one in this case, it follows that foreign agents also 
overconsume the general good.  
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In both cases, the relative price of the special good is higher than the corresponding shadow 
price a in the planner’s allocation. Also, in both cases the bank inefficiently stores silver over the 
winter as backing for agents’ money holdings, needed to fund next summer’s purchases of gen-
eral goods. 
Discussion 
The steady-state monetary equilibrium mimics some features of the pre-1683 situation in 
Amsterdam. Coin (silver) is traded for money and money for goods. The equilibrium stock of 
bank money is constant over the trading “year” and its value lies anywhere between the bank’s 
purchase price and sale price. The nominal stock of money can vary somewhat across steady 
states. Essentially the economy functions on a “silver in advance” basis, i.e., trading in the do-
mestic market proceeds as if domestic goods were traded for silver at price  p σ θ = . 
The inefficiency of the monetary equilibrium stems from three sources. The first source of 
inefficiency is simply the deadweight cost of the silver  1
b S  necessary to support the exchange 
bank arrangement which, from (35), is decreasing in the market value of money θ. The second 
source is the credit constraint on domestic agents, who must finance their stage 1 consumption 
from their previous year’s earnings. The final source of inefficiency is the monopoly pricing un-
dertaken by the domestic agents. The Corollary states that in equilibrium, these latter two factors 
in combination lead to an inefficiently high relative price and diminished consumption of the 
special good. Consumption of the general good may also be inefficiently subsidized. 
Monetary steady states with receipts 
A receipt system is now introduced into the model. Specifically, suppose that in addition to 
its previous activities, the exchange bank is willing to issue receipts against deposited silver. The 
receipt allows its holder to purchase the deposited amount of silver, at the price of  1 θ = .
70 
Under the receipt system, a foreign agent arriving in Amsterdam in stage 1 may sell silver in 
two ways: (1) directly trade silver for bank funds, or (2) deposit the silver into the exchange 
bank, thereby obtaining access to bank funds (at the bank’s purchase price  1 θ =  units of silver 
per florin) and a receipt, which can be sold for additional bank funds. The market value of the 
receipt in stage 1a of period t is  t λ  florins. Absence of arbitrage requires 
                                                 














Under (36), a foreign agent is indifferent between trading silver on the open market and trading 
receipts on deposited silver. Below we consider equilibria where an indifferent agent always 
chooses to deposit his silver and sell receipts against some portion of it. Let  1 D  denote the 
amount of silver deposited by a foreign agent in stage 1, and let  1 L  denote the quantity of re-
ceipts sold by the agent in stage 1 trading. When silver is traded exclusively as receipts, clearing 
in the stage 1a silver market requires that 
  21 (1 )
d M L λ =+  (37) 
i.e., money held by domestic agents must cover the cost of redeeming deposited coin at full value 
( 1 θ = ) plus the cost of the receipts necessary for redemption.  
Using (36), it is then straightforward to show that foreign agents’ first-order condition (24) is 
exactly as in the previous model. The domestic agents’ optimization problem is also unchanged 
from the earlier analysis; in particular, condition (30) is identical with the no-receipt case. 
A steady-state monetary equilibrium with receipts consists of, in addition to the list of quan-
tities for a monetary equilibrium without receipts, a quantity of stage 1 deposits  1 D  and of re-
ceipts  1 L , and a money price of receipts λ such that conditions (24) and (30) hold and markets 
clear. From the foregoing discussion we have 
Proposition 2. With receipts, there is a continuum of steady-state equilibria; each equilibrium is 
identical to an equilibrium with receipts, except in the following details: 
(1) The money price of receipts λ is indeterminate in the interval ( )
1 0, 1 θ
− − , where the im-
plied silver value of money  1/(1 ) θ λ = + and the money price of domestic goods p fall in 
the same ranges as in Proposition 1; 
(2) Period 1 deposits of foreign agents are  11 Dc = ; 
(3) Period 1 receipt sales of foreign agents are  
  12 1 ;




Proposition 2 indicates that (absent aggregate liquidity shocks) the introduction of the receipt 
system would not in of itself have changed real allocations in the Amsterdam money markets. 
The value of bank money remains indeterminate and the inefficiency of the monetary equilib-
rium persists. 
There is however a substantive difference between the equilibria described in Propositions 1 
and 2. If bank money cannot be redeemed without a receipt, then following the money market 
trades in stage 1a, the value of claims on the banks’ stock of silver would have also been reduced 
relative to the no-receipt case. This would have expanded the scope for the bank’s credit activi-
ties. 
Lending operations before receipts 
In practice the operation of the AWB incurred costs, which were offset through earnings on 
its loans. These elements are now introduced into the model. 
Momentarily assume that the bank has access to sufficient capital so that its liquidity con-
straints are not binding. The annual operating cost of the exchange bank is  0 γ > , which is ex-
pressed in silver terms. The bank obtains silver by trading money for silver in the stage 1 markets 
at price θ. This money is earned through loans to domestic agents in stage 1, which are repaid at 
stage 2. Domestic agents may borrow up to  tt qB florins, where q is the bank’s discount and 
  1 tt t px Β ≤ A  (39) 
for  ( ) 0,1 ∈ A , i.e., a domestic agent can borrow at most a fraction A of his anticipated autumn 
special goods sales. The bank’s breakeven constraint is 
  1 (1 ) tt t qB θ γ − − ≥  .  (40) 
The bank does not seek to maximize profits from lending, but simply sets q to recover costs. 
Domestic agents’ budget constraints (27) and (29) are replaced with 
  ( ) 2, 1 2, 1 1 1
dd d d
tttt t t t t SM q B S M θθ −− ++ ≥ +  (41) 
  11 2
dd
tt t tt M px M B + ≥+  (42) 
For a favorable discount (q β > ), a domestic agent will borrow as much as possible and borrow-
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′ < ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
′′ ≥ ⎪ ⎩
 (43) 
where 
** () ( 1 ) q β ββ β == + − > AA A . The foreign agents’ problem does not change. Effectively, 
the availability of credit lowers domestic agents’ marginal cost of producing special goods from 
/ a β  to  /* a β . An equilibrium in this case must satisfy (43) as well as the foreign agents’ first-
order condition and (24). Equilibria are described as 
Proposition 3. For operating costs  0 γ >  sufficiently small, there is a continuum of steady-state 
monetary equilibria with exchange bank lending where 
(1) Allocations, the silver-equivalent price of special goods  p σ θ = , and the real stock of 
bank money are the same in every equilibrium; 
(2) The price of money and the money price of special goods are indeterminate as in Proposi-
tion 1; 
(3) The summer (end of period 1) nominal money stock varies with θ the according to 
  1/ Md θ =  (44) 
 where  1 d  is the equilibrium consumption of the general good by domestic agents; 
(4) Money is held exclusively by foreigners over the summer and domestic agents over the 
winter 
  12 1 ;0 ;
yd d MMq B M M =+ = =  (45) 
(5) Neither domestic nor foreign agents store silver over the winter 
  211 0;
dyo SSS = == (46) 
(6) The exchange bank stores sufficient silver to satisfy its liquidity constraint (20) 
  ( ) 12 1 /.
bb SS M d δθ δ θ θ == =  (47) 
 
Proof. Since only the domestic agents’ first-order condition (43) is modified from the previous 
cases, proof is by the same arguments. 
 
Does lending by the exchange bank improve welfare? To answer this question, one must con-
sider the capital costs of the bank’s lending program. If lending leads to an increase in consump- 
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tion by domestic agents  1 d , then from (20) the bank must hold additional capital to maintain its 
liquidity. As a reference case, imagine that bank’s stock of silver is obtained through a one-time, 
lump-sum tax on domestic agents only.
71 The following result then applies. 
Corollary. The monetary equilibrium with lending is inefficient. However, for operating costs 
0 γ >  sufficiently small, there is some equilibrium with lending that dominates the monetary 
equilibrium without lending. 
Proof. Inefficiency of the equilibrium with lending follows from the same arguments as in 
Proposition 1. 
We now compare equilibria with lending to the equilibrium without. Again two cases must 
be considered. We consider the effects of a vanishingly small amount of lending (a small in-
crease in the credit limit A over  0 = A ). 
Case 1.  (1) / TR a β ′ < . The silver-equivalent price of special goods σ is equal to 1 for both the 
equilibrium with lending and the equilibrium without. In this case, allocations are same in both 
equilibria, but domestic agents produce at (effectively) a lower unit cost ( /* a β =  with lending 
compared to  / a β  without). Thus, with lending, domestic agents’ utility increases and the ex-
change bank need hold no additional silver in order to satisfy its liquidity constraint. Foreign 
agents’ utility is unaffected. Hence lending dominates for this case. 
Case 2.  (1) / TR a β ′ ≥ . The silver equivalent price of special goods σ is less than 1 in the 
equilibrium without lending. Then it is straightforward to show introducing lending causes both a 
decrease in σ and an increase in foreign agents’ utility. 
Now consider the steady-state utility of domestic agents. Using (6) this is 
  12 (1 ) b da f S β − −−  (48) 
when the bank’s silver holdings  b S  are financed by a lump-sum levy on domestic agents. Using 
(43) and (47) rewrite expression (48) as  
  ()( )
11 1( 1 ) / [ ](/* ) [ ](/* ) TR TR a TR a β δθθ β β
−− ′′ −− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  .  (49) 
                                                 
71 I.e., direct taxation of foreign agents is not possible. As discussed previously, in practice the bank’s capital de-
rived at least partly from accumulated profits on lending. Obtaining capital in this way would have imposed addi-
tional costs beyond the costs of the lump-sum levy considered here, but also would have shifted some of the bank’s 
capital costs to foreigners.  
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The derivative of (49) with respect to A is 
  () [] ()
2
1
() 1 ( 1 ) / *
**
aa
qT R ββ δ θ θ β
β β
− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ′ ′ −− −− − ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 (50) 
whose sign varies as the sign of 
  ( ) 1( 1 ) / * β δθθ β −− −  .  (51) 
As  0 γ →  and  1 q → , (51) is positive iff  
  ( ) 1/ δ θθ −> A  ,  (52) 
and, since  () /1 δθθ< , condition (52) must hold for  0 > A  sufficiently small. In words, domestic 
agents’ utility is increased if lending is slightly increased from zero. Note, however, sufficiently 
large increases in lending A may decrease domestic agents’ utility. 
Discussion 
The corollary to Proposition 3 shows that lending by the AWB could have increased welfare 
even with a liquidity requirement such as (20). The need for substantial backing of bank money 
would have imposed limits on the bank’s lending however. Beyond a certain point, the extra 
profit obtained by increasing loans to domestic agents would have been outstripped by the atten-
dant liquidity costs. From condition (52), the liquidity constraint could have been made less 
binding only by lowering either the bank’s “bid price” for bank money θ  or its liquidity “com-
fort factor” δ. 
From the domestic agents’ point of view, monopoly profits on sales of special goods would 
have been the necessary ingredient for their support of the banks’ lending operations. With com-
petitive pricing of the special good, lending would have provided no benefit to domestic agents 
and no incentive to support this activity. 
 
Lending operations with receipts 
We now consider in more detail how the introduction of receipts would have impacted the 
bank’s liquidity constraints. In the pre-receipt equilibrium with lending, the year-t, beginning-of-
stage 1a (after foreign agents arrive in Amsterdam but before trading) balance sheet of the bank 
is 
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Table 2: Bank’s balance sheet 
(beginning of stage 1, without receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  2, 1
b
t S −   Balances M 




and the bank’s liquidity constraint would be given by (20), i.e., 
2
,1 bt SM δθ − ≥ . After stage 1 trad-
ing (beginning of stage 2) is complete, the bank’s balance sheet is 
 
Table 3: Bank’s balance sheet 
(beginning of stage 2, without receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  1,
b
t S   Balances M 




and the liquidity constraint is  1,
b
t SM δθ ≥ . Since  1, 2, 1
bb
tt SS − =  in equilibrium, the bank’s liquidity 
constraint does not change from stage 1 to stage 2. After stage 2 trading is complete and loans 
are repaid, the bank’s balance sheet is 
Table 4: Bank’s balance sheet 
(end of stage 2, without receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  2,
b
t S   Balances  2
d M  
  NW 
 
The liquidity constraint at this stage is  2, 2
bd
t SM δθ ≥ , which, since  2, 1,
bb
tt SS =  in equilibrium, is 
implied by the previous liquidity constraints.  
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Now consider the bank’s balance sheets at the same stages under the receipt system. At the 
beginning of money market trading stage 1a, the bank’s balance sheet is  
Table 5: Bank’s balance sheet 
(beginning of stage 1, with receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  2, 1 1
b
t SD − +  
Loans to domestic agents B 
Balances M of domestic agents 
Balances  1 D of foreign agents 
[of which  1 D  redeemable on demand] 
  NW 
 
If the bank is only committed to pay coin against all outstanding receipts, its liquidity constraint 
is 
  2, 1 1 1 1 1
b
t SD L D L − + −≥− (53) 
or simply 
  2, 1 1 0
b
t SL − + ≥  .  (54) 
Following stage 1 trading, the bank’s balance sheet is 
 
Table 6: Bank’s balance sheet 
(beginning of stage 2, with receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  1, 2, 1 1 1
bb
tt SS D L − =+ −  
Loans to domestic agents B 
Balances  11 DL λ +  of foreign agents 
[ 11 DL −  redeemable on demand] 
  NW 
 
If the bank is committed to pay coin against all outstanding receipts, its liquidity constraint is 
  2, 1 1 1 1 1
b




  2, 1 0
b
t S − ≥  (56) 
Finally, after stage 2 trading is complete, the bank’s balance sheet contracts to 
 
Table 7: Bank’s balance sheet 
(end of stage 2, with receipts) 
Assets  Liabilities + NW 
Silver  2, 2, 1
bb
tt SS − =   Balances  2
d M  
  NW 
 
Since all receipts have been redeemed by this point, there is no liquidity constraint on the bank. 
To summarize, these calculations indicate that under the receipt system, an expansion of the 
bank’s lending B need not be backed by an expansion of its silver holdings 
b S , essentially be-
cause, under receipts, the bank’s liquidity constraint is slackened from (47) (in its equilibrium 
form) to (56). Indeed, in the steady-state world analyzed here, it is conceivable that the bank 
holds no silver over the winter. To avoid indeterminacy of the silver price of money θ in particu-
lar, however, we assume that the bank must commit (off-equilibrium) to sell silver (i.e., receipts) 
at its target price, and possess “enough” silver  0 S >  to back this pledge. 
This does not explain how large S  must be to guarantee determinacy. As a benchmark for 
the comparisons below, we take S  to be the value of  2
b S  necessary to support the monetary equi-
librium without lending, i.e.,  2
b SS =  as specified in (35). 
Our last set of results confirms agents’ preferences for the receipts arrangement: 
Proposition 4. With receipts, the monetary equilibrium with lending A is identical to the equilib-
rium given in Proposition 3, except that the bank’s winter silver stock  2
b S  is reduced to S . 
Proof. As in Proposition 2, optimality conditions and market clearing are not affected by the in-
troduction of receipts.  
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Corollary 1. For a given credit limit parameter A , the equilibrium with receipts dominates the 
equilibrium without receipts. 
Proof. Decreasing the bank’s winter silver holdings (as occurs with the introduction of receipts) 
does not change allocations of consumption goods, and lowers the deadweight loss. 
Corollary 2. Under receipts, welfare is increasing in A . 
Proof. With receipts, an expansion of lending A  does not result in an increase in the bank’s win-
ter silver holdings 
2
b S . From (47), the bank’s summer silver stock  1
b S  increases but this is occurs 
through voluntary deposits by foreign agents; domestic agents bear no additional liquidity cost. 
Hence this cost does not enter into welfare comparisons. 
Increasing A  increases domestic agents’ welfare increases because, from (43), this lowers 
their marginal costs of production, while their marginal revenue from special good sales remains 
the same. 
Foreign agents’ welfare increases as in Proposition 3; hence, total welfare increases. 